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Cash Transfers: A Review of the Issues in India
This paper provides a review of the arguments for and against ‘cash 
transfers’in  India. It begins by identifying changes in the Indian family 
and household as providing the context for a discussion on increased 
economic vulnerability, inequality and social protection reforms in the 
country. It then considers the principles by which any social policy should 
be judged and briefly reviews the arguments on the two main types of 
policy on poverty in India. The paper goes on to discuss cash transfers 
alongside other instruments of social policy such as the Public Distribution 
System (PDS) and Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS). It then explores a typology of cash 
transfers and examines the principal hypotheses associated with the 
arguments for and against transfers as a social policy instrument. These 
debates draw upon international experiences and are also explored in 
the context of corruption, financing and the role of cash transfers in the 
aftermath of ecological, social or economic shocks. The paper concludes 
with a discussion on the viability of cash transfers in enabling choice and 
in changing individual attitudes and behaviour, especially with regard to 
demand for quality public services.
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Introduction
The objective of this paper is to provide a review 
relevant to India of the arguments for and against of 
what are usually called ‘cash transfers’. As we shall 
point out, the term is more nuanced than suggested 
by its use in casual comments in the media or by 
academic observers. Part of the problem with the 
state of the debate on cash transfers in Indian policy 
circles is due to the breadth of the term. What most 
commentators understand by cash transfers are non-
contributory cash transfers or tax-based transfers.
As the writer of the following paper has been an 
advocate of an unconditional cash transfer policy for 
many years, he is likely to show a normative bias2. 
However, every effort has been made to set out 
the issues in an objective manner in the hope that 
readers will be able to make up their own minds on 
the relative appeal of the different points. It begins 
by considering principles by which any social policy 
should be judged, and then briefly reviews the 
arguments for and against the two main types of 
policy towards poverty that have been taken in India.
 
The debate on cash transfers has been obscured 
by a rather strident tone adopted by some 
contributors to it. There are obviously ideological 
and philosophical issues, but in evaluating the 
potential for cash transfers, the writer asks readers 
to suspend their own biases and prejudices and to 
be as objective and dispassionate as they can. In 
particular, one should avoid red herring arguments. 
There should be no question about the need for 
an integrated, well-funded, efficient and equitable 
set of public social services available to all in an 
affordable way. Cash transfers and anti-poverty 
measures in general should not be considered as 
negating the need for such services. Of course 
there are controversies about how they should 
be provided and financed, but no society should 
contemplate diminishing its universally available 
public social services. 
Above all, what we should all take as shared is a 
commitment to reducing poverty and economic 
insecurity across India. In that regard, we should 
begin by recognizing that, very clearly, the current 
set of policies and institutions is not functioning 
Cash transfers and 
anti-poverty measures 
in general should not 
be considered as 
negating the need 
for universal and 
affordable public social 
services.
2. The writer is a founder member of BIEN (the Basic Income Earth Network) set up in 1986 and is presently its 
co-president, with Senator Eduardo Suplicy of Sao Paulo and Professor Claus Offe. BIEN has generated extensive 
research on cash transfers and held its 13th International Congress in Sao Paulo in July 2010.
1. Introduction1
1. This review is a personal perspective and its views should not be attributed to SEWA or UNICEF. However, thanks 
for comments and encouragement are due to Mirai Chatterjee, Sarath Davala, Renana Jhabvala, Astha Kapoor, 
Deepjyoti Konwar and Ramya Subrahmanian. Thanks are due, as well, to the National Advisory Committee members, 
to whom an early version of the paper was presented. Comments would be welcome and acknowledged. Email: 
<Guystanding@standingnet.com >. The paper draws in part on several earlier publications. Guy Standing, ‘How cash 
transfers promote the case for basic income’, Basic Income Studies, vol. 3, issue 1(April 2008): pp. 1–30; idem, ‘How 
cash transfers boost work and economic security’, United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs, New 
York, United Nations, 2008.
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efficiently or equitably. After a remarkable and 
sustained period of high economic growth, the 
number of people in desperate poverty remains 
at least as high as before the ‘take-off’ began, 
despite statistics to the contrary, which are surely 
understatements of the extent of the problem. 
At a conservative estimate, there are over 300 
million Indians living in dire poverty in spite of 
two decades of remarkably high rates of economic 
growth. The Tendulkar Committee, whose report 
was accepted by the Planning Commission in April 
2010, revised the estimate of the number of people 
living below the poverty line, and it found that 37 
per cent of the Indian population was poor, that is, 
435 million people – almost ten percentage points 
more than the previous estimates. Others have put 
the figure even higher. 
Moreover, income and wealth inequalities have 
become much sharper and more threatening to 
the social stability of the country. It is not just 
poverty but economic insecurity that mars the 
social structure. The Arjun Sengupta committee 
estimated that over three-quarters of the Indian 
population were economically vulnerable and living 
on less than Rs 20 a day, which was regarded as 
the minimum needed for bare survival at the time, 
that is, at 2004–2005 prices. Even so, the National 
Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized 
Sector (NCEUS) issued a comprehensive report in 
April 2009, which revealed that despite many years 
of high economic growth, 77 per cent of India’s 
population continued to live on less than Rs 20 
per day. At 2004–2005 prices, the number in this 
category rose from 811 million in 1999–2000 to 836 
million in 2004–2005, at a period when the national 
economy was growing at unprecedentedly 
high rates.
In 2011, until September, the Planning Commission 
continued to keep Rs 20 as the cut-off for defining 
poverty, which even more artificially represented 
the extent of poverty, as there had been extensive 
consumer inflation in the past decade. Then the 
Planning Commission filed an affidavit in the 
Supreme Court settling the cut-off at Rs 32 in urban 
areas and Rs 26 in rural areas. 
In sum, given the persisting widespread poverty, 
defenders of the existing social protection system 
would seem to have a lot of explaining to do to 
justify retaining it. 
That is the context in which we should be 
considering the appeal of cash transfers. And, we 
cannot fault ‘government’ for an overall lack of 
social spending, if we take account of the full range 
of policies covered by that term, including subsidies. 
It is not a problem, in short, of resource constraints 
or funding. The failure revealed by those poverty 
and inequality figures reflects a failure in design and 
implementation. In reality, the two aspects cannot 
be separated.
The other major contextual point to take into 
account is the government’s recent announcements 
and associated actions on cash transfers. They were 
mooted in the Government’s Economic Survey of 
2010–2011, and the Finance Minister announced 
in his Budget speech of 2011 that consideration 
was being given to replacing some subsidies with 
direct cash transfers. This seems to be eminently 
reasonable, because it does not tie down the type 
of subsidy that would be ‘replaced’, while implicitly 
recognizing that in an increasingly monetized 
economy, having money is crucial. 
 
The report of the 
NCEUS (2009) 
revealed that despite 
many years of high 
economic growth, 
77 per cent of India’s 
population continued 
to live on less than Rs 
20 per day.
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Most importantly, in June 2011 the committee set 
up by the Finance Minister under the chairmanship 
of Nandan Nilekani reported on the phasing in of 
‘direct cash transfers’ as what it described, cleverly, 
as a supplement to subsidized basic goods. We will 
consider aspects of the Nilekani interim report in a 
later section. But it is worth citing a statement from it.
The Task Force does not recommend substitution 
of public provisioning by the State. Instead it 
recommends a solution whereby the subsidies that 
are being provided by the State now can be more 
efficiently provided to the intended beneficiaries 
directly. It complements public provisioning by the 
State, rather than supplanting it. It also enables 
the State to reach out to the deserving intended 
beneficiary more effectively3. 
Note the clever way of bypassing what has been 
the most controversial aspect of the debate. At this 
stage, we should accept the way this has been put, 
but we should go further by asking all those involved 
in the public debate to state the principles by which 
they think any social policy should be judged. 
This does not mean that ultimately there must 
be comparisons between alternatives if they set 
out ostensibly to meet similar ends, which are, 
in this discussion, to reduce the incidence of 
poverty and economic insecurity or vulnerability to 
impoverishment. It would be intellectually dishonest 
for anyone in this great debate to deny that there is 
always an opportunity cost when it comes to 
the mobilization and allocation of resources for 
social policy.
In trying to take stock of the claims and counter-
claims made about effectiveness of cash transfers, 
this paper starts by considering what philosophical 
or moral-ethical criteria should be used to 
evaluate the cash transfers, in absolute terms, 
and in comparison with the two main alternative 
social policy approaches to reducing poverty and 
economic insecurity. 
Very briefly, the cash line must be evaluated in 
comparison with what we may describe as the food 
and commodity line (provision of goods and services 
for free or at subsidized prices for those designated 
as ‘the poor’) and the labour line (provision of labour 
to the poor, in return for monetary payment or food). 
These are the three main ways by which government 
can try to cut poverty and economic insecurity 
directly – through providing goods needed by people, 
through providing work or labour for payment so 
that they can buy the goods they think they want, 
and through providing money to buy such goods and 
develop work opportunities. 
To do full justice to these issues, it would be 
necessary to write a long report or book. So we ask 
the readers’ indulgence if the latter two approaches 
to economic security are treated rather schematically. 
It seemed to be essential to mention them as 
reference points. In reality, there is no need to see the 
three approaches as sharp alternatives. All of them 
can be used, but it is their relative effectiveness in 
addressing poverty and insecurity that should be kept 
in the forefront of our attention.  
 
3. Interim Report of the Task Force on Direct Transfer of Subsidies on Kerosene, LPG and Fertiliser, New Delhi, June 
2011, p.11. Emphasis added.
There is always an 
opportunity cost 
when it comes to 
the mobilization and 
allocation of resources 
for social policy.
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India is rapidly becoming a leading component of the 
global economy, and in considering how to construct 
an efficient and equitable social protection system, it 
is essential to design one that would correspond to 
the structure of Indian society of the future, not one 
suited to the past. This may seem to be obvious, but 
it can easily be overlooked by policymakers and their 
advisers steeped in traditional ways of looking at the 
social and economic structure.
It is likely that national income will double in a 
decade. Whether one likes it or not, market forces 
are spreading as India becomes an increasingly 
commercialized and monetized economy, in which 
liberalization and flexible labour markets will be 
dominant features almost regardless of governmental 
regulatory restrictions. India will also be increasingly 
urban, and the geographical mobility of the 
populations will surely grow. 
In the process, families will be increasingly stretched, 
so that ‘thin’ relationships of mutual support will 
displace ‘thick’ relationships. More households will 
contain in-migrants, return migrants and potential 
migrants – a trend that should influence the design of 
the social protection system. Households and family 
patterns will be what economists call endogenous, 
that is, they will be determined in part by policy and 
not be just parameters for the design of social policy4. 
For Indians, as for everybody, ‘family’ is precious. 
But policy should be constructed on an appreciation 
that the size and structure of households vary and 
evolve, and they should be allowed to do so without 
outside interventions that block people from making 
rational and free choices. Most people would agree 
that strengthening family relationships would be 
a laudable objective of social policy. But policies 
that serve to rigidify household structures are not 
necessarily ‘family friendly’.
In any case, already the stretching of family 
relationships has led to erosion of informal familial 
and community mechanisms of social support, or 
what we have called family benefits and community 
benefits in the total social income of people in India5. 
In those circumstances, more and more people will 
be disinclined to provide income support to relatives 
or friends, because the reciprocity that underpins 
family-based social protection is being eroded. This 
will increase people’s economic vulnerability in 
the face of shocks, hazards, risks and uncertainty. 
This trend has considerable implications for the 
desirability of a household-based or family-based 
system of social protection.
4. This point is pertinent for policy evaluations and the design of surveys to be used for that purpose.
5. For an empirical study showing this trend, see G. Standing, J. Unni, R. Jhabvala and U. Rani, Social Income and 
Insecurity: A Study in Gujarat (New Delhi: Routledge, 2010).
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2. The Economic and  
Social Context
Cash Transfers: A Review of the Issues in India The Economic and Social Context
14 15
While households and families are being stretched, 
globalization has ushered in a related trend that also 
has implications for the type of system that would 
be feasible or desirable. This is the changing class 
structure of Indian society. One can see that there 
is something like a five-speed India evolving in the 
growth process6. Income inequality has grown but 
has also changed in character. 
At the top of Indian society, there are a tiny number 
of vastly wealthy people who constitute an elite, with 
economic power that feeds into political power. They, 
along with others who live off financial and other 
capital, have seen their incomes rise sharply. Below 
them in terms of average income are the proficians, 
those with bundles of electronic, scientific or other 
skills that enable them to share in the affluent 
lifestyle. The elite and the proficians are enjoying a 
high-speed growth of income.
Travelling at a slower speed has been the salariat, 
many of whom are in the public sector or in large-
scale corporate bureaucracies. They have relatively 
strong employment security and access to enterprise 
benefits, but their incomes have been lagging behind 
the first group and gradually they are facing growing 
employment and income insecurity. Almost certainly, 
the number in the salariat will shrink in the coming 
decade, and more in it will find that private benefits 
and state benefits on which they have relied will 
shrink and be inadequate to give them a strong sense 
of economic security and social protection. In the 
coming years, this is likely to affect their attitude to 
social protection and to cash transfers in particular.
   
However, one may predict that it is the two strata 
below the salariat where economic insecurity will 
grow most. There is the old working class, always 
small in India but now shrinking, as it is in every part 
of the world. If we think of this group and the elite 
and salariat, one may quesstimate that they account 
for about 15 per cent of the Indian population, most 
in the tax-paying range, even if many do not pay 
what they should pay. 
Anyhow, below those three groups in terms of 
income and economic security is the huge and 
growing precariat, people living on their wits, 
scraping a living, giving a modern meaning to the 
peculiarly Indian concept of ‘the unorganised sector’. 
There is a difference between people who survive 
year after year on some known economic activity, 
however low an income that provides, and the 
rapidly emerging precariat whose labour and work 
and income are volatile and unpredictable7. They 
are poorly placed to gain from the market-based 
economic growth that is inherent to globalization.  
To put it bluntly, they are slow-tracked.
Below the precariat and the informal economy in 
and around India’s cities, there is village India. To 
a large extent, the rural population has been left 
out of the growth process, and their incomes have 
lagged, even though there is a diminishing number 
of villages that do not have some links to modern 
markets, and even though some villages have 
6. One should not be distracted by the exact nature of the imagery. However, it is useful to keep in mind how 
development can stratify in new and more intensive ways. It is essential to escape from a dualistic approach, the most 
egregious of which is a sharp distinction between ‘the poor’ and ‘the non-poor’. 7. G. Standing, The Precariat – The New Dangerous Class (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2011).
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flourished while many others have experienced some 
changes. But gradually the share of the population 
in village India will shrink, and village life will be 
subject to more and faster commercialization and 
cash-based relationships. One should not base social 
protection policy on an image of static communities 
of traditional activities and extended family networks 
of reciprocity. For better or for worse, the economic 
basis will continue to evolve, and this will surely have 
implications for the type of social protection system 
that should be developed.
Finally, in thinking about what system is desirable, 
it is essential to appreciate the changing nature of 
economic insecurity induced by globalization. If 
society were stable and characterized by extended 
families in virtually closed communities, then 
one could think of a system that would provide 
compensation for occasional mishaps. If society 
were to consist of almost the whole adult population 
in stable full-time jobs, then a system of social 
insurance could be imagined whereby so-called 
contingency risks could be predictable and thus 
enable government to calculate probabilities and 
to administer a system of compensatory payments 
in whatever form. But neither of these situations 
remotely resembles the India of today nor the India of 
any number of tomorrows.
Globalization and the market system are generating 
a situation characterized by a growing incidence of 
social and economic shocks. People are exposed to 
a high probability that whole communities will be 
hit by a growing incidence of costly hazards, where 
events that may be regarded as normal life-cycle 
events (such as marriages, births, illnesses and 
deaths) are economically threatening, because of 
their rising cost and their rising capacity to disrupt 
income flows. On top of shocks and hazards, there is 
a growth in the extent of economic uncertainty, which 
by definition is uninsurable. 
If the population is exposed to shocks, hazards and 
economic uncertainty, there will be a high level 
of economic insecurity. In those circumstances, a 
system of social protection that tried to provide 
compensatory or ex post benefits would be 
inappropriate, if not largely irrelevant. One would 
need a system that gave a much greater weight to 
ex ante security, coupled with a capacity to respond 
to and recover from emergencies. In moving forward 
on social protection reforms in India, this background 
reality should be borne in mind.    
On top of shocks and 
hazards, there is a 
growth in the extent of 
economic uncertainty, 
which by definition is 
uninsurable
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It is often asserted that a policy is successful or 
unsuccessful without a clear idea of what constitutes 
its success. Suppose, for example, politicians use a 
simple head-count figure of the number of people 
in ‘poverty’ following the introduction of a certain 
policy. A typical claim to success might be that as a 
result of this policy the number of poor went down, 
which might be interpreted as success. But this 
could have been achieved as a result of lowering 
the economic growth rate and thus raising the 
probability of more people being poor in the near 
future; or it could mean that the least-poor gained, 
while the most-poor were made worse off; or that 
‘success’ was achieved at the price of forcing more 
of the previously poor to perform onerous labour 
that would increase the probability of impairing 
their long-term health or capabilities, and thus the 
probability of worse future poverty. 
In all three cases, one might question the claim to 
success – such as a the policy that resulted in putting 
more people into ‘near poverty’ by diverting funds 
from schemes that would have given greater social 
protection to the economically vulnerable.
Similarly, one should not evaluate the success or 
failure of a policy without considering the efficiency and 
opportunity cost of the resources devoted to it. And one 
should measure success by considering whether that 
specific policy achieves the outcome more effectively or 
less effectively than available alternatives.
These points are ‘obvious’, but too often overlooked. 
They are particularly important when considering 
something as apparently emotive and ideologically 
charged as ‘cash transfers’. Another problem with 
policy evaluation is the tendency to judge policies by 
what might be called ‘low-hanging fruit’ criteria, that is, 
by factors that are easiest to measure or observe. For 
instance, one cannot measure an increase in freedom or 
personal autonomy by the number of children sitting in 
a school or the number of people labouring on the road.
Bearing those points in mind, we can begin at the 
philosophical-ethical level and then move to less 
abstract criteria of evaluation. In this regard, as 
described at length elsewhere, the principles by 
which any social policy can be evaluated may be 
compressed into five. We reiterate them without detailed 
commentary, primarily to have them borne in mind in 
the following review.
1. The Security Difference Principle
A policy or institutional change is socially just only 
if it improves the security and work prospects of the 
least secure groups in society.
So, for instance, if a policy boosted the job 
opportunities of middle-income groups while 
worsening the prospects of more disadvantaged 
groups, it could not be justifiable unless the losers 
were compensated in ways they found acceptable. 
One should not 
evaluate the success 
or failure of a policy 
without considering 
the efficiency and 
opportunity cost of 
the resources devoted 
to it. 
3. Principles of Evaluation
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The Security Difference Principle stems from the 
work of Rawls, who from a liberal, philosophical 
perspective essentially argued that social and 
economic inequalities are just only if they allow for 
the betterment of the worst-off groups in society8. 
Whether or not one accepts the Rawlsian perspective, 
this can stand as a moral precept. A policy should 
be judged by whether or not it helps the least secure 
(or most insecure). If it does not, one should be 
uneasy (especially if it benefits others who are less 
insecure) unless some other principle is recognized 
that is demonstrably superior. If so, it would be up to 
the evaluator to state it and support it. A key point is 
that there should be a right to a minimal amount of 
resources so that it enhances the capacity to develop 
and exercise ‘effective freedom’. 
2. The Paternalism Test Principle
A policy or institutional change is socially just only if 
it does not impose controls on some groups that are 
not imposed on the most free groups in society.
The second principle is ignored by too many donors 
and analysts working comfortably in affluence. 
Paternalism is rife. According to this principle, forcing 
people to do certain forms of labour or ‘jobs’ when 
others in society are not forced to do them would 
be counter to social justice, even if the government 
authorities genuinely believed that the policy would 
be for the material betterment of those required 
to do them. Underlying this principle is the Millian 
liberal view that there is a prima facie case against 
paternalism (except in the case of young children and 
the medically frail), particularly against forms that 
constrain the freedoms of the disadvantaged. 
Among other aspects, this principle requires that all 
groups who could be subject to paternalistic direction 
have a voice (collective and individual) in order to 
represent their interests. Only with voice can people 
have a semblance of control over their work and 
lives, and only by having control can there be any 
decent meaning in the idea of dignified work. 
Relevant to the paternalism principle, it is notable that 
recent research on the popular subject of happiness 
has reiterated that people who have greater control 
over their work and life are happier and the same 
holds true when taking into account the influence 
of access to benefits9. Control means, among other 
things, having the capacity and opportunity to 
make decisions independently without their being 
determined by the state, or by patriarchal figures, or 
religious or other institutions that dictate how people 
must behave. 
This principle is particularly important when 
considering how governments have gone about 
social integration through welfare reforms. It is about 
‘effective’ or ‘full’ freedom, for which basic economic 
security is essential. If integration is achieved by 
means that take away or limit the freedom of people 
to make decisions on their lives, one should be wary 
about regarding the policy as laudable. 
8. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).
9. J. Haidt, The Happiness Hypothesis: Putting Ancient Wisdom to the Test of Modern Science (New York: Basic 
Books, 2005).
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3. The Rights-not-Charity Principle
A policy or institutional change is socially just if 
it enhances the rights of the recipient of benefits 
or services and limits the discretionary power of 
the providers.
This principle is also crucial for assessing the 
appeal of alternative social policies. A right is 
possessed as a mark of a person’s humanity or 
citizenship and cannot be made dependent on 
some behavioural conditionality. So, for instance, 
people should not be expected to have to plead 
for assistance in times of need, or to have to rely 
on the selective benevolence of civil servants or 
politicians. Their social and economic entitlements 
should be rights, not matters for the discretionary 
decisions of bureaucrats, philanthropists or aid 
donors, however well meaning those may be.
The ‘right to work’, much discussed and asserted 
for the past 150 years, is relevant here. If there 
is such a right, then there must be an obligation 
on someone to provide it. But who or what is it? 
And how could someone hold others to respect 
his or her ‘right’? One cannot sensibly say there 
is a right for every person to be given a job of 
their unrestrained choice – not everyone can 
be a president or chief executive. What one 
could defend is the principle that everybody 
should have a claim right to an equally good 
opportunity to pursue and develop their work 
capacities and competencies. This equality of 
opportunity requires policies and institutions to 
enable every person in society to develop equally 
their productive capacities should they wish to. 
Guaranteeing people jobs they do not want is 
scarcely an affirmation of any right to work, but 
creating the space for them to pursue a decent 
working life surely is.
In this regard, there is merit in Article 1 of Title 1 
of the Charter of Emerging Human Rights that was 
adopted at the Barcelona Social Forum in November 
2004 and that was drawn up by an international 
group including senior representatives of all the 
relevant bodies of the United Nations. This asserted 
the right to existence under conditions of dignity, 
which comprised a right to security of life, a right to 
personal integrity, a right to a basic income, a right 
to healthcare, a right to education, a right to a worthy 
death and a right to work, defined as follows: 
The right to work, in any of its forms, remunerated 
or not, which covers the right to exercise a worthy 
activity guaranteeing quality of life. All persons 
have the right to the fruits of their activity and to 
intellectual property, under the condition of respect 
for the general interests of the community.  
In sum, schemes should be evaluated by whether 
or not they strengthen or weaken those rights, with 
those strengthening them being preferable.
4. The Ecological Constraint Principle
A policy or institutional change is socially just only 
if it does not involve an ecological cost borne by the 
community or by those directly affected. 
This is a quintessential twenty-first century principle. 
Potential ecological consequences must be built into 
the policy, not put as an afterthought. For instance, 
there may be a trade-off between jobs and ecological 
sustainability and revival. Does a short-term growth-
What one could 
defend is the principle 
that everybody should 
have a claim right 
to an equally good 
opportunity to pursue 
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maximization strategy benefit all or most people 
living in a country? The commercial drive to pursue 
growth and profits without taking account of social 
externalities is a recipe for global ecological disaster. 
For evaluation purposes, what an ecological principle 
means is that transfer or job-creation schemes should 
be subject to the constraint that they should not 
deliberately or wilfully jeopardize the environment. 
In this context, for instance, one could argue that 
subsidies intended to boost employment or job-
creating investment should be modified to promote 
only ecologically beneficial work and skills.
The ecological constraint principle provokes emotional 
reactions, which hold that any such condition is a 
protectionist device penalizing developing countries, 
forcing them to slow economic growth and incurring 
costs that hinder development. Regrettably, in the 
coming decades, global warming and other forms 
of pollution – including many emanating from poor 
working conditions in the specious interest of job 
promotion – will hurt many more people in developing 
countries and do so devastatingly. The principle must 
be respected everywhere. 
5. The Dignified Work Principle
     
A policy or institutional change is just only if it does 
not impede people from pursuing work in a dignified 
way and if it does not disadvantage the most insecure 
groups in that respect.
To some degree this is incorporated in the Rights-
not-Charity Principle. However, the two-part test in 
this principle involves two value judgements – that 
work that is dignifying is worth promoting (whereas 
deterioration in working conditions or opportunities 
would not be), and that the policy should enhance 
the range and quality of work options of the most 
insecure groups more than for others. While this may 
seem complicated, the main point is to determine 
whether or not a scheme favours more freely chosen 
work opportunities and capabilities.
In sum, we can proceed, based on the five principles, 
to evaluate alternative policies. We make no attempt 
to state priorities, merely that they can be used as 
a guide for evaluations and policy design. Schemes 
that satisfy all the principles would be ideal. Although 
a comparative assessment of policies might be 
based on more than the five principles, they may be 
regarded as a coherent set of principles consistent 
with a belief in a complex egalitarianism in which the 
expansion of full freedom is given priority through 
basic economic security for all. One can criticize 
this position; however, if anybody wishes to specify 
alternative principles for evaluation, those should be 
stated clearly and transparently. 
Before proceeding further, it is also worth recalling 
Tony Atkinson’s two measures of poverty-reduction 
efficiency – vertical and horizontal – the former 
measuring the extent to which there is leakage 
(money intended for the poor going to the non-poor) 
and the latter measuring the extent to which the 
poor are actually helped10. The difficulty with this 
dualism is demonstrated in the following example: 
a scheme may reach 70 per cent of a target group, 
but those may be the least severely affected within 
the group, leaving the worst-off 30 per cent no 
10. A. B. Atkinson, ‘On targeting and family benefits’ in Incomes and the Welfare State: Essays on Britain and Europe, 
A. B. Atkinson (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
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better off or even worse off. Using the horizontal-
vertical efficiency approach could produce 
other difficulties as well. For instance, if another 
programme reached 70 per cent of the worst-off 
and did so at the cost of leakage to the non-poor, 
it might be judged less efficient, without good 
reason. For this sort of reason, it is advisable to 
be cautious about evaluating policies using the 
language of efficiency. 
Finally, in thinking of principles by which to 
evaluate social policy, it is essential to understand 
the nature or character of poverty and economic 
insecurity. Poverty in one place may differ from 
poverty in another, just as economic vulnerability 
and insecurity vary by place, time and type of 
economy. If one were dealing with a chronic lack 
of food, then, obviously, increasing the supply 
of affordable food will have high priority. If one 
were dealing with an inability to afford available 
food, then an alternative policy might be more 
appropriate. Similarly, if one were dealing with an 
industrialized economy in which the vast majority 
were in stable full-time jobs or being supported 
by one or more people in such jobs, then a social 
insurance system might be the optimum policy, 
whereas if, as in India, the vast majority were 
not in such jobs or supported by anybody in 
them, then relying on social insurance benefits to 
compensate for economic risks would 0be futile11. 
These points are particularly relevant at this 
time of rapid structural and economic change 
across India. With economic growth rates that 
are extraordinarily rapid by historical standards, 
the nature of poverty and economic insecurity is 
likely to be changing quite sharply. It is likely that 
proportionately fewer of the poor are not 
‘food-poor’, but poor in the sense of lacking access 
to other needs.      
11. Social insurance is the term used to describe schemes designed to provide compensation for a predetermined 
specific contingency risk through the payment of contributions, either by the person covered or by his or her employer. 
The contributions go into a designated ‘fund’ from which benefits are paid to those adversely hit by the specified risk. 
Crucially, it involves risk-pooling, so that if equal contributions are made, those with a low risk of the adverse outcome 
cross-subsidize those with high risk. Social insurance cannot work equitably if most people are not in a position to be 
covered. It also raises severe moral hazard problems, and in reality cannot deal with economic shocks or uncertainty, 
as discussed elsewhere in the paper.
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We spend far too much money funding subsidies in 
the name of equity, with neither equity objectives nor 
efficiency objectives being met12. 
  
This paper is intended to focus on cash transfers. 
But we must consider them in contrast to, or as a 
complement to, existing policies, the most notable 
being the provision of subsidized food, through the 
Public Distribution System (PDS). There has been 
a tendency to discuss cash transfers in India as if 
they exist purely as an alternative to a ‘food security’ 
policy. We reject this dichotomy, but let us recall 
some awkward realities.
In general, whether in India or anywhere else, a policy 
to provide free food or at subsidized prices for those 
designated as poor has several distinctive features. 
First, it implicitly presumes that what the poor lack 
most is food. Of course, in many parts of the country 
that is true, on average. Millions of Indians go to 
sleep hungry and wake up with little prospect of 
overcoming their hunger. However, in the emerging 
market economy of India, the presumption that the 
poor are suffering from ‘food poverty’ may not be as 
reasonable as it was in traditional village India. One 
may be wretchedly poor but may have access to just 
enough food. But the reality remains that food aid is 
easy to legitimize politically and socially. 
The biggest problem is that the system of subsidized 
food targeted on the poor does not work13. And it is 
hugely expensive. Its defenders admit both these 
claims, but argue that the system could be improved. 
Sceptics might retort that this is wishful thinking at 
best. The degree of inefficiency is enormous, not 
marginal. Most observers know of Rajiv Gandhi’s 
famous assertion that 85 per cent of the money 
poured into the system is diverted from the poor. 
Whatever the exact figure at the time, the inefficiency 
remains chronic. 
The government and the World Bank admit that 59 
per cent of the grain allotted to public distribution 
for the poor does not reach low-income households. 
The Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, 
Montek Singh Ahluwalia, said in 2009 that in his 
view only 16 per cent of the food allocated to the 
12. Speech of Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister, at the inauguration of the golden jubilee year of the Institute of 
Economic Growth, 15 December 2007, available at < http://pmindia.nic.in/lseech.asp?id=629>.
13. In this paper, we will not discuss the assertion that the PDS provides private farmers with income security. There 
are arguments for and against having buffer stocks and minimum support prices. However, by comparison with 
the PDS, there are surely better ways to provide basic income security for farmers while improving incentives to 
raise productivity and output. Many observers believe the system benefits larger scale farmers to the detriment of 
smallholders. See, U. Misra and N.S. Ramnath, ‘Are direct cash transfers better?’, Business.in.com, 21 March 2011, 
< http://business.in.com/article/briefing/are-direct-cash-subsidies-better/23422/0> 
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PDS reached the poor14. At about the same time, the 
Planning Commission estimated that only 27 per cent 
of PDS expenditure reached low-income groups, and 
the Finance Minister described it as ‘an albatross 
around our neck and an opportunity for rent seekers 
to enrich themselves’.
While inefficiency and waste characterizes the PDS, 
some parts of the system of food aid designed to 
provide ‘food security’ are chronically inefficient. For 
instance, it apparently costs one Rupee to distribute 
every one Rupee’s worth of food for school meals. 
The Planning Commission estimated that the cost of 
transferring one Rupee of food cost 3.65 Rupees to 
administer, as was admitted by the Finance Minister 
at a meeting of the National Development Council on 
19 December 200715.  
Defenders of the PDS argue that it provides both food 
security and income security by enabling the poor to 
spend on non-food essentials while protecting them 
from food price fluctuations. These were the claims, 
for example, made by the political group Rozi-Roti 
Adhikar Abhiyan Delhi in their note of protest against 
the Delhi pilot cash transfer scheme16. The claims 
deserve to be taken seriously. However, the advocates 
need to explain how the inherent and solidly 
established failings in the PDS could be overcome. 
Thus, it is not enough to say there are ‘identification 
errors’ in identifying those to be called ‘poor’, 
which could supposedly be corrected. The simple 
fact is that there is no statistical method that would 
identify the poor accurately. Whatever methodology 
is used, there will be substantial exclusion errors 
and substantial inclusion errors. Adding criteria and 
proxies merely open up scope for further errors 
and inefficiencies.
Even though defenders of the PDS recognize its long-
established imbalances such as ‘irregular supply’ of 
food items and ‘food grain leakages’ before the food 
reaches the fair price shops, they contend that some 
states, such as Tamil Nadu and Chhattisgarh, have 
corrected for these failings. Thus they contend, that 
if the PDS could be improved elsewhere it would 
work optimally.
This is currently a popular view and lies behind 
the two versions of the Food Security Bill devised 
in the first half of 2011.The Bill was designed to 
broaden entitlement to subsidized food, opening 
up the prospect of a vast increase in government 
expenditure on food subsidies. One should accept the 
well-meant hopes in having more local procurement, 
local storage and local disbursement mechanisms. 
But even if a remarkable and unprecedented 
improvement were to occur in overcoming the 
distribution problems, and even if suddenly the petty 
and not-so-petty corruption were to end, the PDS 
would still suffer from fundamental structural failings. 
It is ultimately a distortionary device.
The fundamental trouble with a free-food or 
subsidized-food system is that an undervalued 
(subsidized) product will be undervalued by 
consumers. Of course ration shop owners defend 
the system, because it gives them a cosy monopoly. 
But this takes away any incentive or pressure to 
ensure that the quality of the food is high or that it 
14. Reported in The Economist, 10 September 2010, p. 30.
15. Available at: <http://pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=34136> 
16. ‘We want food, not cash! Universalise and strengthen the PDS’, Delhi, March 2011.
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is delivered and available on time and in adequate 
amounts. It should not be at all surprising that the 
PDS has become what one newspaper called, 
…a clever ploy to palm off barely edible stuff to the 
vulnerable people. The premise, it appears, is that like 
beggars, they cannot be choosers. But miffed at the 
mouldy wheat and worse, those who are supposed to 
accept it gratefully are no longer doing so17…. 
In general, one could say that subsidized food 
transfers are relatively preferable in situations where 
markets are not functioning18. But the provision 
of subsidized food may simply ensure that proper 
markets do not develop or function well. As many 
studies have shown, food subsidies distort markets 
and act as a disincentive to work19. 
Similarly, on the demand side, if one obtains certain 
food items at well below market price, the consumer 
will tend to be wasteful. And if the market price of 
food exceeds the ration shop price, which it usually 
will, this will become a powerful incentive for ration 
shop owners and others to divert food items so as 
to sell them in the open market and thus divert them 
from the intended beneficiaries.
Then there is the endemic problem that subsidies for 
specific non-food items tend to block technological 
change. This is strikingly apparent with regard to 
subsidized kerosene in India. One feels almost as if 
the subsidy was invented by producers of kerosene, 
since traditionally kerosene was not used much 
as a cooking fuel in rural India, while for lighting 
it is inferior to electricity, but it is subsidized even 
where there is electrification20. There is plenty of 
international evidence that utility subsidies (water, 
electricity, kerosene, housing, etc.,) tend to benefit the 
non-poor more than the poor21.  
Another peculiar claim made in connection with 
food transfers is that people not really in need of 
subsidized food will ‘self-select’ themselves out of the 
system because of stigma or time-cost and other costs 
of using it. This is strange because surely those with 
least energy or living farthest from ration shops (often 
in the poorest areas) will be the least able to access 
the ration shops. 
Some defenders of the PDS say that the only way to 
make it efficient is to make it universal. In other words, 
every person in India would be entitled to subsidized 
food or at least certain types of food, such as those 
called ‘staples’. This means that people who do not 
want or need it would nevertheless get it, opening up 
the prospect of a secondary market or, more likely, 
creating a tendency to forego the entitlement or treat 
it casually and wastefully. Here there is a contradiction 
– some social scientists have argued that the non-poor 
would be put off taking their entitlement because of 
‘long queues’ and ‘poor quality’ of the food22, which 
17. ‘Editorial: PDS rot’, Tribune, 27July 2011. Url: <www.tribuneindia.com/2011/20110727/edit.htm#2> 
18. U. Gentilini, ‘Cash and food transfers: A primer’, Occasional Paper No.18, Rome, World Food Programme, 2007.
19. See, for example, T. Beesley and R. Kanbur, ‘Food subsidies and poverty alleviation’, Economic Journal, vol. 98, 
1988, pp.701–719.
20. D. Kapur, ‘The shift to cash transfers: Running better but on the wrong road?’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 
XLVI, no. 21, 21 May 2011, p.83.
21. See, for instance, K. Komives et al, ‘Utility subsidies as social transfers: An empirical evaluation of targeting 
performance’, Development Policy Review, vol. 25, issue 6, 2007, pp. 659–679.
22. For a non-committal review of this claim, see R. Shrinivasan, ‘Against the grain: Ration saga’, The Times of India, 
19 March 2011. ,<www.timescrest.com/society/ration-saga-5015>  
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would mean that high transaction costs and poor 
quality could be imposed on the poor as the means of 
making the system function. This would hardly be a 
desirable process.  
Usually, the poorest people have the most onerous 
labour and work schedules, leaving them with little 
time or inconvenient time schedules to trek to ration 
shops and wait in queues in the hope that items 
would have arrived. In any case, self-selection out 
of a scheme is scarcely a laudable objective. The 
reasons why people do not try to use the PDS would 
be surely the low quality and unreliable supply of 
food, the stigma associated with being a menial 
claimant and the amount of time it takes to apply for 
subsidized items. In our Gujarat social income survey, 
we found all sorts of reasons why people were not 
being covered by the PDS system, some of which 
were mainly to do with the design and quality of the 
PDS, some to public infrastructure and some to the 
situation of villagers23. 
Finally, there is the well-established fact that a system 
of subsidies induces chronic corruption epitomized 
by, but not restricted to, immense ‘food theft’. This 
was shown dramatically in Uttar Pradesh in reports in 
early 2011, although the events related to 2004–2005 
and was described as ‘the mother of all scams’24. The 
corruption is so deeply ingrained that it would be 
naïve to imagine that it could be rectified.   
23. Standing, Unni, Jhabvala and Rani, Social Income and Insecurity, 2010.   
24. G. Pandey, ‘India’s immense “food theft” scandal’, BBC News South Asia, 22 February 2011. Available at: 
<www/bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12502431?print=true> 
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The second popular route to tackling poverty and 
economic insecurity is the provision of labour for 
the designated poor. Obviously, in India this leads 
to consideration of the Mahatma Gandhi National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS, 
formerly NREGS) and public works in general. 
Again, we do not wish to be diverted into having a 
full debate on the claims and counter-claims made 
with respect to these initiatives. Indeed, there is no 
need to depict cash transfers as an alternative to 
them; they could be complementary, and perhaps 
cash transfers that are not linked to labour might help 
make labour-based schemes more effective. However, 
there are certain features of the labour line that 
should be borne in mind.
The main claims in favour of the labour line and the 
use of public works, in general, are that they
i. are well targeted on the poor, 
ii. create jobs, 
iii. result in the construction of public 
infrastructure, 
iv. supplement incomes from other sources, 
v. tend to push down wages, 
vi. help to reduce seasonal income variability and 
vii. are equitable because they are self-selecting.
 
The morality of the last claim is suspect, because self-
selecting is not equitable; only those in real economic 
need would undertake onerous labour, which is also 
stigmatizing. Therefore it would lead to a justification 
for making the labour as unpleasant as possible, 
which is scarcely a moral way of tackling poverty. 
The arguments against the labour line as social 
policy are numerous. Almost by definition, they are 
paternalistic, offending the Paternalism Test Principle, 
because they involve controls imposed on those 
needing assistance. They are also short-term, not 
lasting, and often involve ‘make-work’ activities that 
have no economic justification beyond giving some 
people something to do25. 
Many critics also believe that, whatever the planners’ 
intentions, applying the labour line route is bound 
to be selective and would result in poor targeting, 
because many of the most desperately poor will 
be excluded while more of the near-poor will be 
included. In other words, the policy in practice almost 
certainly offends the Security Difference Principle. 
For example, if the labour on offer and the payments 
are attractive, as they should be if the policy is to be 
ethically grounded, then the first to apply, the most 
persistent and vociferous and the best connected will 
be much better placed than others to gain from 
the policy. 
25. For a good review of the international experience, see A. McCord and J. Farrington, ‘Digging holes and filling them 
in again? How far do public works enhance livelihoods?’, London, Overseas Development Institute, Natural Resources 
Perspectives, no.120, 2008.
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Those with disabilities, or who come from labour-
constrained households, or who come far from 
the places where labour is on offer, or who have 
no contact with the sarpanch or other well-placed 
intermediaries, will be pushed aside. There is no 
justifiable reason to suppose that the policy can be 
well targeted on the most insecure and poorest. 
 
The opinion that the labour should be stigmatizing, 
since that will strengthen the self-targeting aspect, is 
a morally deplorable justification for it. Indeed, any 
policy that creates stigmatization is inappropriate. That 
many of the poor rush to perform low-wage labour 
on short-term projects does not mean they relish the 
prospect of such activity; it may merely mean that they 
need to survive in the absence of something else that 
would give them economic security.
It is often pointed out that public works usually result 
in very poor output, as in ‘washed-away-roads’ and 
bridges. Under the MGNREGS, for example, fewer 
than half the projects begun between 2006 and 2011, 
including road building and irrigation systems, were 
actually completed. It would have been cheaper 
to have had them built commercially, where the 
systems might have survived much longer. If they 
had not been completed or if they had collapsed 
afterwards the state could have held contractors 
financially responsible. Nobody can be held liable 
fairly if the objective is really to ‘make-work’ for the 
poor, and the contractors are denied the sensible 
option of being able to use modern machinery.  
 
Inevitably, public works have very high 
administrative costs as well as high monitoring 
costs (which is one reason why usually they are not 
subject to careful monitoring). The people in charge 
of implementation rarely have proper incentives 
to ensure that the labour is efficient and of high 
productivity. They are aware that commercial criteria 
are not the primary justification for the policy. So, 
resources are systematically wasted. One estimate 
by S.Guhan has concluded that only 22 per cent 
of the expenditure on the Employment Guarantee 
scheme has reached the poor26. But, the MGNREGS 
has not been subject to thorough evaluations of the 
sort that its defenders demand should be applied 
to cash transfers. 
As for the poor and economically insecure who 
undertake the labour, they too know that producing 
excellent output is not the primary or even secondary 
objective. They are invariably poorly trained, and 
thus inherently relatively unproductive, unless the 
labour is essentially meant to be low-productivity 
work, in which case it does not matter. If evidence-
based policy were the mantra, the MGNREGS would 
have been abandoned long ago. If the policy intention 
is to maximize low-skilled manual jobs, then it is 
a contradiction to assert that skill generation is an 
objective of the policy. Workers are not allowed to 
use machines that would raise the productivity and 
quality of their labour; instead, they must use heavy 
pickaxes and shovels. This suggests an approach 
scarcely consistent with the Dignified Work Principle.
This leads to one interesting argument that has been 
made in favour of the MGNREGS, which is that it 
has strengthened the bargaining position of workers 
in their local communities. Indeed, there have 
26. Cited in D. Kapur, P. Mukhopadhyay and A. Subramanian, ‘India’s poor: From raw deal to new deal’, 
Business Standard, New Delhi, 15 January 2008
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been anecdotes of complaints by farmers that they 
cannot obtain labour or have to pay more for it. The 
question one should ask is whether the implied wage 
rise is due to people being unavailable because they 
are labouring on a MGNREGS project or because 
the workers have already earned money from the 
scheme so that they can hold out for higher wages. 
If the answer is the former, then the labour is acting 
as a constraint on local production. If the answer 
is that it is because the workers have more cash 
and can hold out for better wages, then production 
would not be constrained, and the farmers would 
be able to offer what is justified by the potential 
productivity on the farms. For people earning from 
MGNREGS, a non-labour-using cash transfer would 
be economically preferable and socially less onerous. 
One positive aspect of labour-for-cash schemes is 
that they can help overcome seasonal income and 
consumption variability. In this regard, MGNREGS 
seems to have had some success27. However, one 
is entitled to ask whether other forms of assistance 
could do that role better. In any case, because one 
can surely cite examples of income smoothing, that 
does not mean it does so in general.
 
Introducing labour-for-cash or labour-for-food 
schemes can also be disruptive of local livelihood 
strategies, for they may take away somebody from 
contributing to labour or work on family or other 
local activities at critical times, which could lower 
the output of the whole group. The labour line also 
discriminates against labour-constrained households, 
those without members who are available to take 
such jobs. The poorest households often have 
people who are ill, aged or frail who cannot go out 
to do such labour. Or drawing one person away may 
leave others in even more vulnerable circumstances. 
And they can be particularly onerous for women, 
who are already under time pressure owing to their 
household and other work, and who are expected to 
indulge in labour that is often energy-draining and 
hard. These realities often mean that the calories 
used up in the labour exceed the calorific value of 
food that could be purchased as a result of the low 
pay from the labour. 
Public works and other benefit-for-labour schemes 
also have what are called substitution effects and 
deadweight effects. For example, if people are 
paid to labour on a public subsidized scheme, 
that in itself will lower the opportunity for private 
firms or individuals to do the type of activity. This 
substitution could be disadvantageous economically, 
since, in the long run, commercial firms survive by 
providing acceptable quality output that will lead 
them to being hired again and again. They will thus 
be discouraged and possibly just opt out of the 
economic activity altogether.
 
This leads to one peculiarity of public works and 
cash-for-labour benefits, which is that they tend to 
lower wages in low-income areas. In this regard 
MGNREGS has surely had a better record than its 
predecessors. It has had a fixed wage that has often 
been above the local market wage for unskilled 
manual labour. But usually the wage paid on such 
schemes is set deliberately below the market rate 
for comparable labour. This must drag down market 
wages, unless there is a tight labour market with 
minimal unemployment, which is scarcely the case 
27. S. Ravi and M. Engler, Workfare in Low-Income Countries: An Effective Way to Fight Poverty? The Case of NREGS 
in India, (New Delhi: Indian Business School, 2008).
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over much of the country. And there is ample scope 
for local administrators to use piece rates and other 
devices to lower the real hourly or daily wage.
Above all, in India the labour line is almost 
guaranteed to lead to political capture, bureaucratic 
capture and blatant corruption. It is impossible 
to prevent such schemes being ‘discretionary’ 
and discriminatory in some way or in many ways 
simultaneously. This is perhaps the most important 
reason that such approaches are supported by 
politicians and middle-class groups ensconced in 
public policymaking. They can intervene and steer 
schemes to groups whose support they want, or 
ostentatiously make it appear that it is due to them 
that certain groups have benefited. It becomes a 
form of patronage.  
In sum, while one will always be able to point to 
particular successes and beneficial effects of a huge 
social policy, one should consider the opportunity 
cost of the resources poured into it. In general, the 
labour line mixes commercial and social objectives 
in an unsustainable way. It scarcely succeeds in 
passing the Policy Principles and has systemic 
economic drawbacks that make it poor social policy. 
However, it is worth reiterating that cash transfers 
could coexist with labour-for-cash schemes, should 
policymakers wish to persist in spending vast 
amounts on the latter.
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The term ‘cash transfers’ covers a multitude of 
policies. Almost all governments and countries have 
some cash transfers in their system of social policies. 
But the modern debate is really about addressing 
poverty and economic insecurity through direct 
non-contributory cash transfers. Within that general 
description, there are a wide variety of possible 
schemes, which we may summarize as follows.
1. A Typology of Cash Transfers
Cash transfers figure in every social protection 
system. But the twenty-first century debate has 
been fired by the broad realization, by more and 
more economists and social policy designers, that 
the standard form of the twentieth century, namely, 
social insurance, cannot and will not work well in the 
open, informal, flexible labour market economies of 
the twenty-first century. 
 
In other words, the social security basis of welfare 
state capitalism, namely, contributory-based 
social insurance simply does not work efficiently 
or equitably in today’s world. It is a regrettable 
characteristic of critics of new forms of cash transfers 
that they fail to appreciate that old contingency-
based benefits, such as unemployment insurance 
benefits, are both ineffective and inequitable. They 
certainly do not reach those working informally or 
those in the rapidly growing precariat28. We will 
not discuss social insurance here, but its defenders 
should explain how it could be ‘extended’ to the vast 
majority of the Indian population or indeed the vast 
majority of the global population.  
Today, the most common image of cash transfers is 
one of cash handed out to the poor through direct 
transfer in a particular location or via bank accounts 
or postal accounts. This raises two possibilities. We 
may refer to this as the targeting dilemma. Either 
the cash transfer could be given only to ‘the poor’ 
or it could be given universally, that is to everybody 
deemed to be in the ‘population at risk’29. 
Intuitively, those not versed in the debates are 
inclined to think that the latter – giving it to 
everybody – would be inequitable, wasteful and 
unaffordable. But there would be no reason to 
think that the government could not tax back the 
equivalent from higher earning individuals, either 
through income tax, or through VAT or sales tax on 
items purchased primarily by the richer groups. In 
other words, in principle, one could have targeting 
ex ante or ex post. Suffice to add at this stage 
that it is not obvious which route would be more 
efficient or equitable.
28. On the reasons, see Standing, The Precariat, 2011.
29. The term ‘universal’ is actually ambiguous. For example, should short-term immigrants be included, or those who 
are not legalized residents or those not classified as full citizens?
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6. The Cash Transfer Line
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1.1 Targeting
The first distinction is between targeted and universal 
cash transfers. The idea of targeting is that only the poor 
are entitled to receive the cash. This obviously raises 
all sorts of questions about how potential recipients 
are to be identified. With the best will in the world, the 
outcome is inevitably somewhat arbitrary. 
Although there are several forms of targeting – 
household means testing, proxy means testing, 
geographical targeting, community-based targeting and 
so-called self-targeting – the essential point of departure 
is a desire to focus benefits on those deemed to be poor, 
by using some notion of a poverty line.
A ‘poverty line’ must be subjective to some extent, 
because people in poverty or near poverty will tend to 
experience fluctuating levels of poverty. They may be 
just above whatever line has been chosen in one week 
while in another week they may be well below it. In 
India, the reality is that procedures are so cumbersome 
that determining whether or not some household 
is poor will be done years before entitlement to a 
benefit is put into effect. In short, targeting is riddled 
with errors, both conceptual and practical30. At every 
point, difficulties arise, with ignorance, fear, mistakes, 
bureaucratic hostility or indifference, discretionary 
decision making and much else.
Targeting by means testing is always inaccurate, with 
large exclusion and inclusion (or Type I and Type II) 
errors. We do not need to repeat all the well-known 
reasons for these failings. Elaborate attempts to develop 
proxy means tests (sets of indicators correlated with 
income poverty) are no better, because they have 
identified the poor rather inaccurately, often at great 
expense and with long lags between the gathering of 
data and the classification of people and households31. 
This is what the Saxena Committee recommended for 
identifying those deserving to be BPL card holders32. 
It will prove to be cumbersome and as prone to high 
exclusion and inclusion errors as similar schemes have 
proven elsewhere in the world.  
There is another more structural failing of targeting, 
whether means tests or proxy means tests are used. 
Targeting automatically creates poverty traps. A policy 
that is supposed to be exclusively for the poor must 
create moral hazards and immoral hazards. The former 
arise from the fact that if a person or household can 
obtain a benefit only if they are classified as poor, then 
it would pay to stay poor. One of the immoral hazards is 
that it would pay to pretend to be poorer than one is.
The effective cost of going from just below the poverty 
line to just above would be the equivalent of a marginal 
tax rate of over 100 per cent, since they would lose 
more than the gain in income. But it is this reality that 
also prompts the immoral hazard. A poor person who 
gains a little more earned income is going to have a big 
incentive to conceal it, so as not to lose entitlement to 
the means-tested benefit33. 
31. For a recent review that also reaches this conclusion, see Development Pathways, ‘Targeting the Poorest: An 
Assessment of the Proxy Means Test Methodology’, Canberra, Australian Government, AusAid, September 2011. 
32. Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, Report of the Expert Group to Advise the Ministry of Rural 
Development on the Methodology for Conducting the Below Poverty Line (BPL) Census for 11th Five Year Plan, Delhi, 
Ministry of Rural Development, August 2009. The Task Force was chaired by N.C. Saxena.
33. Means testing also create something that is never appreciated by planners, which I have called precarity traps. 
Standing, The Precariat 2011. There are heavy transaction costs for claimants, owing to the complex procedures that 
must be followed when applying for benefits. 
30. For a critique, see R. Jhabvala and G. Standing, ‘Targeting to the “Poor”: Clogged pipes and bureaucratic blinkers’, 
Economic and Political Weekly, vol. XLV, nos 26–27, 26 June 2010, pp. 239–246. 
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Targeting also involves high administrative costs. 
Evidence from all over the world testifies to the 
fact that these are inherent to means testing34. 
When evaluations measure the cost of a scheme, 
they should take account that, in principle, funds 
spent on administrative matters would be available 
to give the recipients more direct benefits.
The simple fact is that in India, targeting has 
been exposed as being thoroughly ineffectual, 
partly because conceptualizing and estimating 
the number of people below any agreed poverty 
line has been thoroughly discredited. Since 
1992, the Ministry of Rural Development has 
conducted censuses to identify the number, and 
in the process the procedures have become more 
and more complex and cumbersome, and some 
economists want to make it even more so35. 
The resultant chaos, as it should be called, has 
been subject to withering criticism36. And it led to 
the Saxena Report in 2009, which was as far as 
the system could go. As its chairman observed, 
the failure of targeting was shown up by the 
National Statistical Survey, which showed that vast 
numbers of really poor people were excluded from 
having a BPL card, and many who were not poor 
were allocated one37. 
There is another more general aspect of targeting 
that receives too little attention. It implicitly 
presumes that social policy should address 
yesterday’s not tomorrow’s poverty in giving help 
to those who have fallen into poverty rather than 
to those in danger of falling into it38. To reduce 
poverty most effectively, one should prevent 
it, especially bearing in mind that it is almost 
certainly less costly to prevent it than to help 
people to recover from it.
There have been several good studies that have 
looked at whether targeted or universal benefit 
programmes have the greater effect in reducing 
poverty. Since they minimize errors of exclusion, 
targeting schemes have fared rather badly. In the 
four largest Latin American countries, targeting 
schemes on average reached less than half of the 
poorest 20 per cent, which implies that they do 
rather badly by the Security Difference Principle. 
Similar failings were revealed by Brazil’s Bolsa 
Familia and Mexico’s Oportunidades39. In China, a 
study found that cities where targeting was more 
developed were significantly less likely to reduce 
the incidence of poverty40.    
34. A study in Honduras found that the cost of identifying beneficiaries accounted for 26 per cent of all operational 
costs. N. Caldes, D. Coady and J.A. Maluccio, ‘The cost of poverty alleviation transfer programmes: A comparative 
analysis of three programmes in Latin America’, Washington, DC, FCND Discussion Paper No.174, 2004.
35. See, for instance, S. Mehrotra and H. Mander, ‘How to identify the poor? A proposal’, Economic and Political 
Weekly, vol. XLIV, May 2009, pp. 37–44.
 
 
36. See, for instance, A. Saith, ‘Downsizing and distortion of poverty in India: The perverse power of official 
definitions’, Indian Journal of Human Development, vol.1, no.2, 2007, pp. 247–281. 
37. N.C. Saxena, ‘Do targeted schemes and programmes reach the poor?’, paper presented at the International 
Seminar on Poverty in Bihar, Patna, April 18–20, 2010. 
38. A. Krishna, ‘For reducing poverty faster: Target reasons before people’, World Development, vol. 35, no. 11, 
pp. 1947–1960. 
39. K. Lindert, E. Skoufias and J. Shapiro, ‘Redistributing income to the poor and the rich: Public transfers in Latin 
America and the Caribbean’, Social Protection Discussion Paper No.0605, Washington, DC, World Bank Institute, 2006; 
F.V. Soares, R. Perez Ribas and R.G. Osório, ‘Evaluating the impact of Brazil’s Bolsa Familia:
Cash transfer programmes in comparative perspective’, IPC Evaluation Note No.1, New York, United Nations 
Development Programme, International Poverty Centre, 2007. 
40. M. Ravaillon, ‘How relevant is targeting to the success of an antipoverty program?’, World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 4385, Washington, DC, The World Bank, 2007.
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In sum, anybody retaining belief in the validity of 
targeting for any form of state benefits is allowing faith 
to triumph over facts. As one ‘father’ of the post-1945 
European welfare states put it, policies that are for the 
poor only are invariably poor policies. Indeed, some 
have deduced a paradox of redistribution that the more 
the policies are targeted on the poor, the less likely that 
poverty and inequality will be reduced41. If there is one 
aspect of Indian social policy in general that needs fresh 
thinking it is targeting. 
1.2 Selectivity
A second distinction is between selective and universal 
cash transfers. Prominent advocates of cash transfers 
in India have presumed that cash transfers would 
be selective and targeted and linked to the BPL card 
system42. 
The idea of selectivity is that a decision is made that 
groups with certain characteristics are deserving of help, 
rather than others. The most common schemes are 
those that provide cash payments to only women who 
are mothers of young children, those that provide men 
and women over a certain age with a cash payment as 
a pension, and those that provide people with specific 
disabilities with a cash payment. 
Commonly, cash transfer schemes have been designed 
to be both selective and targeted, so that, for instance, 
only women with children and with low incomes receive 
the cash payments. Note that with each decision on 
selective entitlement there are procedures that are not 
easy to apply in local communities. It should also be 
borne in mind that many of the reasons for the failure of 
targeting are similar in the case of selectivity. Both raise 
moral hazards and immoral hazards.
With selectivity, there is inevitably a tendency to 
omit people who are poor but who do not fit into the 
demographic or social category selected for special 
treatment, and there are usually plenty of people 
supported who would not otherwise be singled out for 
special social assistance. But immoral hazards are also 
strong. If a person will receive support only if she or he is 
in that situation, it will tend to induce people to enter it or 
stay in it. This can scarcely make for good social policy.    
1.3 Conditionality
A third distinction is between conditional and 
unconditional cash transfers. This is perhaps the most 
controversial aspect of cash transfers at the moment. 
Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) have become 
enormously popular and in 2009 gained the official 
support of the World Bank, which poured loans of over 
$2.4 billion to start and scale-up CCT schemes in 2009 
alone. The Bank has defined them in a rather specific, 
narrow way:
Conditional cash transfers are programmes that transfer 
cash, generally to poor households, on the condition 
that those households make pre-specified investments 
in the human capital of their children43.  41. W. Korpi and J. Palme, ‘The paradox of redistribution and strategies of equality: Welfare state institutions, inequality 
and poverty in western countries’, American Sociological Review, vol. 63, no.5, pp. 661–687;      T. Mkandawire, 
‘Targeting and universalism in poverty reduction’, Social Policy and Development Programme Paper No.23, Geneva, 
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2005.
42. D. Kapur, P. Mukhopadhyay and A. Subramanian, ‘The case for direct cash transfers to the poor’, Economic and 
Political Weekly, 12 April 2008, pp. 37–43; idem, ‘More on direct cash transfers’, Economic and Political Weekly, 22 
November 2008, pp. 85–87.
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43. World Bank, Conditional Cash Transfers: A World Bank Policy Research Report (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 
2009), p.1.
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However, CCTs have often had other motives and 
applied many other conditions that have little to do 
with so-called human capital. This has been one 
of the problems, because sometimes the various 
supposed objectives have been potentially in 
competition, if not in conflict.
Commentators have become too slack in their 
discussion of conditional cash transfers – as if 
they are all of one type. There are actually several 
types of conditions – those that have to be satisfied 
prior to receipt of a benefit, those that have to be 
satisfied during receipt of it, and, in more rare types, 
conditions that have to be satisfied after or as a 
result of the benefit. 
The most common distinction is based on one or 
more behavioural conditions, such as entitlement 
based on a child’s attending school for at least 
85 per cent of the time, or on sending a child to a 
health clinic at least once a month. But actually the 
conditionality blends into selectivity and targeting. 
As such, the state becomes deeply paternalistic and 
really promotes forms of dependency.
Conditions in Latin American cash transfer schemes 
have been associated with a significant incidence 
of exclusion from receipt, because people who 
are entitled to the scheme withdraw when they 
cannot comply or find it hard to comply with one 
or more conditions. In Mexico, it was found that 
those who tended to be excluded in this way were 
predominantly the poorest, often because the burden 
of compliance was too great for them to bear44. 
Among the team members conducting the SEWA-
led pilot cash transfer projects, there was extensive 
discussion on conditionality.  It led to a consensus 
that opposed the idea of conditionality45. 
It was also strongly backed by local leaders of SEWA. 
The fundamental reason for this decision is that it is 
presumptuous of policymakers to think that people 
need to be steered to make decisions in their own 
best interest. They are adults and can make such 
decisions for themselves. 
By definition, conditions are paternalistic and may 
be patronizing and contrary to human rights and 
principles of freedom. Usually, they are costly to 
apply, inefficient and inequitable, and they may 
be counter-productive and may create barriers of 
suspicion and resentment among recipients towards 
those implementing the policy. They turn policy 
implementers into interferers, at best benevolent, at 
worst quasi-policemen. 
They also raise a moral dilemma. Suppose, for 
example, an impoverished mother is told she can 
receive the cash transfer only if she sends her 
children to school every day; if she cannot force her 
twelve-year old boy to go to school, because she is 
stressed and distracted, will the policymaker take 
away the money, leaving the woman and her son in 
dire poverty? If not, what happens if somebody does 
not send her child to school? Too much discretion 
is given to the bureaucrats, which is not fair to the 
recipients or to the policy implementers. The 
only morally defensible condition to impose on 
CCTs have often had 
other motives and 
applied many other 
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little to do with so-
called human capital.  
44. C. Alvarez, F .Devoto and P. Winters, ‘Why do the poor leave the safety net in Mexico? A study of the effects of 
conditionality on dropouts’, American University, Washington DC, Department of Economics Working Paper, 2006.
45. At the time of writing this paper, there is an ongoing series of pilots of unconditional and universal cash transfers 
conducted by several complementary means. For objectivity reasons, it is preferable not to discuss the details of these 
while they are in progress. The author is a partner in those projects, one of which is being supported by UNICEF and 
led by SEWA, the other by UNDP.
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recipients is that they should adhere to the law, 
which should be equal for all citizens. A condition 
that deviates from the law is unfair; one that merely 
reiterates the law should be redundant.
The fact remains that there is a strong political 
campaign, nationally and internationally, in 
favour of conditional cash transfers46. It must be 
hoped that more of those opposing cash transfers 
in general will turn their hostility towards the 
conditionality rather than towards the idea that 
low-income people should be assisted by having 
more cash to spend to improve their lives. And 
there is little point in having conditionalities if 
the services that the recipients are meant to use 
in return for benefits are defective or absent 
altogether. This would apply particularly strongly 
in many parts of India. Schools, for instance, suffer 
from high rates of teacher absenteeism. Obliging 
children to go to schools that have no teachers 
would scarcely be a rational policy.
There is also a danger that conditionalities beget 
conditionalities, and they would lead remorselessly 
towards a system of social engineering, in 
which cash transfers are used as state carrots 
and state sticks to be given or taken away 
depending on whether entitlement criteria are in 
accord with state-determined norms47. 
In other words, there is a tendency for bureaucrats 
to reason from findings that a conditionality does 
not work, or does not work strongly enough, and 
therefore tougher conditions are needed. Ethical 
principles easily slip into the shadows. It is not a road 
worth taking. 
1.4 Choice of Recipient
Beyond targeting, selectivity and conditionality, there 
are questions over who should be the direct recipient 
of the cash transfer and the related but not identical 
issue of whether or not the cash transfer should be paid 
on a household, family or individual basis. These have 
exercised us in our pilot projects. 
There is a popular view that women should be 
recipients, since it is widely believed that they make 
decisions on spending more ‘responsibly’ than men, on 
average48. But not all women do that, and not all men 
should be presumed to be less responsible. Moreover, if 
just one person is given the cash, intra-family tensions 
will be encouraged. It is likely that many women would 
be under intense pressure to ‘share’ the money. 
We believe it is fair if each individual is provided with an 
equal amount. This does not mean that intra-household 
or intra-family pressures will disappear. But it does set 
up a fair process and provide scope for gender-based 
and age-based bargaining within households.
1.5 Household or Individual?
As for linking cash transfers – or any form of benefit 
for that matter – to family size and structure or 
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46. For a reasoned argument in favour of conditional schemes in the Indian context, see K.S. Prabhu, ‘Can conditional 
cash transfers work in rural India?’, The Wall Street Journal, 15 July 2009. This article praised the Dhanalakshmi CCT 
scheme in particular.
47. In the longer term, this should be one of the major objections to conditional benefits of any kind, and this is why 
social scientists should be wary of what is called libertarian paternalism. For an expansion of this argument, see 
G. Standing, ‘Behavioural conditionality: Why the nudges must be stopped’, The Journal of Poverty and Social Justice, 
vol. 19, no.1, February 2011, pp. 27–38.
48. This is the position advanced by, for instance, Davesh Kapur and Arvind Subramanian, ‘Rahul’s role? Garibi hatao’, 
23 May 2009, mimeo.
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household size or structure, it should be recognized 
that these are not what economists call exogenous 
units. In other words, the size and structure of 
households can change in response to policy changes. 
For instance, if the amount to be paid was determined 
by how many people were ‘staying’ in the dwelling, 
people would have an incentive to have temporary 
migrants classified as usual household residents. 
There are other moral hazards one could imagine. 
Because households are endogenous, it is desirable 
neither to provide cash transfers on a household basis 
nor to analyse their effects solely or largely in terms of 
households. This may be hard to grasp, because most 
people like to think that everything revolves around 
the household as a fixed unit, which quite simply, it is 
not. And this is going to be the reality to a greater and 
greater extent.
 
It is easier and more equitable simply to provide cash 
transfers equally to individuals but perhaps with lower 
amounts for children under a selected age, such as 
those who are below 14 or 16 years. In this way, intra-
household bargaining can be facilitated and a message 
can be conveyed that each person in any household 
counts as an equal, even if patriarchal practices and 
other cultural factors have ruled otherwise.   
  
2. Mechanisms of Introduction
 
Much has been said and written about the practicalities 
of cash transfers in the context of India today. We will 
not deal in detail with the options here, though it is 
worth noting what the options are. We know that the 
majority of the Indian population is ‘unbanked’, that is, 
they do not have bank accounts, and they do not know 
what is involved in having bank accounts nor do they 
trust banks to look after their money. But cash transfers 
do not require banks or bank accounts, although they 
are obviously desirable for many reasons. They would 
be merely easier to administer and less prone to corrupt 
interference if there were universal bank accounts. 
The debate on cash transfers cannot be divorced from 
the discussion on the extension of financialization to 
the Indian population, or what is popularly known 
as financial inclusion. This is laudable, but it would 
be a mistake – and would be unnecessary – to make 
implementation of cash transfers dependent on prior 
or simultaneous financialization, even if having 
individual bank accounts would make it easier to 
operate cash transfers.  
What both critics and advocates of cash transfers should 
appreciate is that the introduction of cash transfers could 
trigger a desirable expansion of not only bank services 
but postal and other forms of income transactions as 
well. This would create a virtuous circle, accelerated by 
the introduction of cash transfers. 
In this regard, an intriguing aspect of the pilot 
unconditional cash transfer scheme in Namibian 
villages in 2008–2009 was that after the initial 
distribution of money ( through a mobile service 
where a van would be used to visit villages once a 
month), the villagers themselves decided to build a 
post office where the money was deposited. The post 
office enabled the villagers to take out part or all of 
the money when they needed it49. The point is that the 
presumption that policies will not prompt changes in 
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49. The pilot scheme set up in Namibia provided unconditional grants in two rural areas for 24 consecutive months. The 
author was a member of the team that designed the project and helped in the analysis of the resultant evaluation data.
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institutional structures or behavioural patterns in 
local communities is unfounded; these can take place 
rapidly and effectively.
There is a more practical aspect relating 
to mechanisms of implementation. Some 
commentators baulk at the prospect of suddenly 
introducing a cash transfer scheme across India, 
daunted by the enormous practical challenges50. The 
fear is surely well founded, but it raises the prospect 
of various forms of ‘roll-out’, analogous to the form 
it took when the anti-retroviral (ARV) treatment 
campaign in dealing with HIV-AIDS was rolled out in 
southern Africa.
Thus, one could imagine that cash transfers could 
start in certain states or areas where there was 
an urgent need for cash injections, or where the 
infrastructure was most congenial or where there 
is a concentration of vulnerable, impoverished 
groups, and then it could proceed with an explicit 
commitment to roll out the scheme over the whole 
country within a feasible planning period. 
In short, if cash transfers are to become a more 
important part of the social protection system, more 
attention should be given to how they could be rolled 
out efficiently and equitably across India.
One argument is that traditionally state benefits 
have tended to be diverted to ‘ghost beneficiaries’, 
that is, people who do not exist or those who have 
died. One study found that when biometric methods 
were introduced in Andhra Pradesh, 12 per cent of 
beneficiaries were found to be ‘ghosts’51. 
Direct cash transfers can be phased in using 
biometrics, but there will still be a need for 
safeguards, since the registration of deaths would 
need to be accurate and rapid to avoid fraud, 
particularly for children for whom an adult care-
provider would be the recipient of the cash transfer, 
and frail elderly whose accounts would be accessed 
by younger relatives. Methods can be introduced to 
limit such fraud, but they must be part of the process 
of implementation.      
50. See, for example, S.A. Aiyar, ‘Cash transfers are a good idea but hasten slowly’, The Times of India blogs, 13 March 
2011.
51. D. Johnson, ‘Case study on the use of smart cards to deliver government benefits to Andhra Pradesh, India’, 
Institute for Financial Management and Research, 2008;
<http://ifmt.ac.in/conf/casestudies/Johnson%20SmartCard.pdf>. On the issues of biometrics and identification 
challenges, see A. Gelb and C. Decker, ‘Cash at your fingertips: Technology for identification and payment in resource-
rich countries’, Centre for Global Development, 2011, draft.
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In this section, we summarize the various 
arguments made for and against direct cash 
transfers, beginning with the common claims 
made against them. Note that we are dealing 
only with non-contributory cash transfers, not 
social insurance, contributory pensions or private 
insurance52. The latter could be seen as potential 
supplements to non-contributory cash transfers. To 
focus on the criticisms and claimed advantages, we 
will not consider the issues of targeting, selectivity 
and conditionality here, the drawbacks of each of 
these having been highlighted earlier.  
1. Arguments against Cash Transfers
The vehemence of opposition to cash transfers 
in India is extraordinary and seems to be largely 
ideological or the standard resort to any relatively 
new idea53. Much of the opposition seems to derive 
from a belief that cash transfers are actually a 
‘smokescreen’ for a wider policy of dismantling the 
public system of support for ‘the poor’. The tone 
of some of the critics amounts to questioning the 
good will or intelligence of those proposing some 
form of cash transfer. 
1.1 ‘Cash Transfers Hide an Ulterior  
       Ideological Motivation’
Often the criticism seems to be motivated by a 
belief that the proposal for cash transfers is the thin 
end of the wedge for a wider strategy of moving 
towards a free market economy in which the 
protective side of the state is dismantled, privatized 
and commercialized. There may be proponents 
of cash transfers who do have such a goal in 
mind. But there is no necessary connection; many 
advocates are fully committed to the preservation 
and strengthening of public social services 
and public anti-poverty measures beyond 
cash transfers. 
The denigration of cash transfers by their 
opponents in strident terms is neither fair nor 
helpful54. Thus, to describe proponents of cash 
transfers as singing a ‘siren song’ is emotive 
hyperbole, since we all know that the sirens lured 
the sailors onto the rocks and to destruction. 
52.On the traditional forms, see P. Dutta, S. Howes and R. Murgai, ‘Small but effective: India’s targeted unconditional 
cash transfers’, Economic and Political Weekly, 25 December 2010, pp .63–70.
53. A. Hirschmann, The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1991).
54. For a critical reaction, see M. Shah, ‘Direct cash transfers: No magic bullet’, Economic and Political Weekly, 23 
August 2008 , pp.77–79. For a response, see D. Kapur, P. Mukhopadhyay and A.Subramanian, ‘More on direct cash 
transfers’, Economic and Political Weekly, 22 November 2008, pp. 85–87.
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The idea that giving poor people cash would destroy 
them is deplorable scaremongering55. Perhaps the 
writers of such articles would like to do without 
money for a while and just subsist on ration goods 
set by a benevolent but inherently inefficient state. 
In principle, the main criticisms of cash transfers can 
be split into strategic, behavioural and practical. We 
also need to recall the design features covered by 
targeting, selectivity and conditionality. But it might 
be useful to start by considering the claims made by 
prominent Indian critics. Jean Dreze, for example, 
has said that proponents suffer from an ‘illusion’ that 
cash transfers can replace public services, which is 
‘remarkably dangerous’56. 
This is unfair, because not only are many proponents 
of cash transfers (including this writer) strongly in 
favour of public social services, but the arguments for 
public services and the arguments for cash transfers 
stand on their own. How public services are funded 
and how user costs are paid are separate issues. 
There are strong arguments in favour of having users 
pay at least part of the cost of using public services, 
such as schooling, health services, roads, electricity, 
gas and water. 
If something is provided ‘free’, as noted earlier with 
respect to food, it tends to induce carelessness by 
some users, a lack of appreciation and a lack of 
desire or need to look after the good or service in 
question. Since we pay for the water we use, we are 
more likely to turn off a running tap than let it run 
had it been supplied free of cost. What should be of 
great concern to defenders of public services in India 
is that the economically vulnerable do not have the 
resources to buy goods and services. 
1.2 ‘Cash Transfers are Unjustified Handouts’
Another traditional argument against cash transfers 
is that they are A ‘handout’ that gives something for 
nothing. This claim, whether valid or not, could be 
made with equal force to any form of direct support 
except for those that apply conditions to entitlement. 
Indeed, it has been used to justify conditionality and 
was one factor in the development of conditional 
cash transfers in Brazil and Mexico, when it was 
thought opposition from the middle class would 
block legitimation of cash transfers in general.
There are several ethical or philosophical arguments 
that proponents of cash transfers have to refute this 
claim. First, wealthy people in the country obtain 
a wide range of benefits without being required to 
give something in return. Children of the wealthy 
receive handouts from the day they are born that 
children from villages could not even dream about. 
Cash transfers could be seen as a minor correction 
for brute ill-luck. Second, the liberalization of the 
economy has undoubtedly benefited a small elite and 
a privileged middle class to a far greater extent than 
the low-income groups in the villages and slums. 
Third, there is what might be called the Painian 
Principle. Tom Paine observed in 1795 that the 
wealth and income of individuals in society actually 
owe very little to their own endeavours and skills 
and much more to the endeavours of the generations 
55. J. Ghosh, ‘The siren song of cash transfers’, The Hindu, 2 March 2011. The article goes on to mock proponents 
of cash transfers. See also J. Ghosh, ‘The cash option’, Frontline, vol. 28, issue 5, 26 February –  11 March , 2011. 
<www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2805/stories/201103110311280510900.htm>. In the latter article, she describes cash 
transfers as ‘a fad’, and as being presented by proponents as ‘a silver bullet’. 
56. J. Dreze, ‘The cash mantra’, The Indian Express, 11 May 2011. For a response, see G. Standing, ‘Give cash some 
credit’, The Indian Express, 28 May 2011.
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that came before them. But we do not know if those 
who made the greatest contributions were our own 
ancestors or those of others around us. 
So, a universal cash transfer would represent a 
social dividend on the investment made by all 
those preceding generations. One could extend this 
argument by saying that the natural resources belong 
to everybody in the country and therefore a dividend 
should go to everybody.
However, it is probably the instrumental response 
to the objection that is most telling for mainstream 
policymakers. This is, as will be argued when we 
come to the advantages, that they are essentially 
social investments, rather than free handouts. If they 
improve, directly or indirectly, health, education and 
productive activity, then they operate to reduce other 
social policy costs and assist in economic growth and 
development. It may be hard to demonstrate all of this 
statistically, but the economic logic is surely telling.  
1.3 ‘Cash Transfers Induce Dependency 
       and Laziness’
Related to the argument that cash transfers would 
be giving something for nothing is the view that 
they would promote dependency and laziness, 
resulting in a reduction in labour supply. This would 
occur because a guarantee of income, regardless of 
work status, age, marital status and ‘need’ would 
allow people to reject labour or to labour less. 
Theoretically, this criticism, if valid, would apply to 
any form of benefit, unless conditions were applied. 
But is it valid? 
There is no evidence that in India or anywhere else 
people are inherently lazy or indolent. The normal 
human condition is to want to better oneself – or, 
in the jargon, to develop one’s capabilities. And if 
an impoverished person is suffering the common 
effects of poverty – malnutrition, listlessness, lack of 
energy and confidence, a proneness to illness and so 
on – then a modest cash transfer could produce an 
improvement that would make it possible for people 
to concentrate, learn, apply themselves and labour.
Another related claim is that people would 
‘waste’ the money if it were given in cash without 
conditions, spending it on private ‘bads’, such 
as tobacco and alcohol. This is a patronizing 
presumption implying that people cannot learn to 
make rational choices. On that basis, one could say 
that the rich should have their money taken away 
because many waste it on whiskey and cigars. 
The argument is disingenuous, at best. Chronic 
insecurity is at least as likely to induce privately 
‘bad’ behaviour.
1.4 ‘Cash Transfers Have Leakages’
Then there are practical objections to cash transfers, 
such as the one made by the Rozi-Roti Adhikar 
Abhiyan Delhi, which said that ‘leakages will remain 
even in cash transfers’. But crucially, they envisaged 
a targeted cash transfer scheme, that is, it would go 
only to those designated as poor. Others have made 
a similar presumption, without targeting being 
either necessary or desirable. 
If cash transfers were of a universalistic type, 
the problem of leakages would surely be greatly 
diminished. It is the targeting that is the major 
cause of huge leakages, since it gives scope 
for discretionary activities by bureaucrats and 
classifiers. Subsidies have inherent tendencies for 
leakages, but cash is at least transparent and has 
fewer avenues open for leakages including leakages 
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into the pockets of government officials and others 
with whom they could collude to siphon off funds. 
A related point is that some opponents of cash 
transfers actually want an ‘incentive for people 
to self-select themselves out of the system’. Why 
should this be a policy motive? It is at best a very 
crude way of discouraging applicants, and there 
is no evidence that those who would be deterred 
would be the least poor or disadvantaged. 
1.5 ‘Cash Transfers Would Be Useless’
Another argument made against cash transfers 
in India is that even if they could be justified on 
the grounds that people could use the cash to 
buy services and goods, they would be ‘useless’, 
because there are insufficient public schools 
and health services for them to use the money 
properly. This, it has been said, is quite unlike 
the situation in Brazil where the cash transfer 
programme Bolsa Familia has been successful57. 
What this argument neglects to bring out is that 
in Brazil, when the cash transfer scheme was 
being gradually rolled out across the country, 
there was also a dearth of decent social services, 
including schools and medical clinics. The cash 
transfers helped create a public demand for them 
and generated public pressure to provide better 
facilities. This led to funds being allocated to 
reward those who did so. 
A more graphic example can be seen in the 
outcome during the course of the pilot basic 
income grant scheme in Namibia. Before the 
introduction of cash transfers, the local medical 
clinic was a run-down little place, which had 
few medicines and which was staffed by some 
demoralized nurses. It functioned in dirty 
surroundings where doctors who were supposed 
to visit the clinic from the nearest town refused to 
come to see patients. And the vast majority of the 
HIV/AIDS sufferers simply did not go to the clinic 
to take any ARV treatment, because they could 
not afford to buy adequate food or have proper 
nutrition essential for the treatment, which was 
free because it was a public service. 
The cash transfers transformed the situation.  
What happened was that the villagers were 
charged a small amount for each medical visit; 
the nurses used the money to buy better medicine 
and to improve the clinic; patients started having 
greater trust in the efficacy of the public treatment; 
the HIV/AIDS sufferers started to buy better 
food and thus were nutritionally able to take the 
treatment. In other words, the cash transfers 
released a virtuous circle. There was no conflict 
between a public social service and the cash 
transfers. The complementarity resulted in an 
improvement in the public social service.
One might argue that this might be a unique 
case. But the point is that the critics seem far too 
keen to jump to conclusions, rather than explore 
the options on how cash transfers could be used 
optimally. In this regard, we will come to the 
theme of the SEWA-led pilot projects in the final 
section of this paper, namely, the hypothesis  
that it is a combination of cash transfer and 
voice for the recipients that offers the optimum 
way forward.   57. Ghosh, ‘The siren song of cash transfers’, 2011.
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1.6 ‘Cash Transfers Would Be Inflationary’ 
It is sometimes contended that cash transfers would 
be inflationary. Narendar Pani, for example, argued 
that this is the most significant danger of cash 
replacing subsidized commodities, seemingly because 
it would lead to an increase in demand through more 
spending power58. 
Of course, this is just one-sided economics for it 
neglects the supply side. If the supply of goods is price 
inelastic, then it might be inflationary, but there is no 
reason to believe that this would be true, given that 
the money would be spent mostly on basic goods and 
services. And to lessen the likelihood of initial inflation 
coming with the introduction of cash transfers, it could 
be arranged that stocks of food and other basic goods 
could be released until there was time for supply to 
increase through the market.
Again, evidence from other countries suggests that the 
influx of money into local economies via cash transfers 
induces a relatively rapid increase in the supply of 
basic goods and services, partly by inducing people 
to grow more food crops, make more clothes and so 
on, and partly by inducing merchants to direct more 
goods and services into these economies.   
2. Arguments for Cash Transfers
Let us now turn to the claimed advantages of cash 
transfer schemes. For convenience, they can be 
split into philosophical, economic, practical and 
behavioural. In this paper, we will focus on the last 
type simply because most of the empirical research 
has been devoted to these aspects. But there is also 
the macro-economic effect of cash transfers, in 
which the influx of money into local economies 
stimulates spending and investment and thus raises 
economic growth59.
 
2.1 ‘Cash Transfers Would Strengthen     
       Economic Citizenship’
Let us start with the moral or philosophical claims. 
Humanitarian relief organizations have come to 
appreciate that the advantages include speed, 
transparency and the ability to allow those in need to 
make choices about how they spend the aid, which 
thereby enable the people to retain a greater sense of 
dignity in times of crisis60. 
 
Beyond that, cash transfers offer a feasible, 
transparent and equitable means of reducing the 
growing inequalities that are endemic and systemic 
in an open, liberalizing economy. The level of 
inequality and its growth are neither healthy socially 
nor economically necessary or beneficial. Indeed, 
some economic research has suggested that high 
and rising inequality actually reduces a country’s 
economic growth, and it also threatens social stability 
and worsens the welfare of those experiencing 
declining or stagnant incomes. 
59. Multiplier effects, associated with Keynesian economics, refer to the income generated that exceeds the initial 
input. Estimating these effects is complex, but for an attempt to do so in Africa, see S. Davies and J. Davey, ‘A regional 
multiplier approach to estimating the impact of cash transfers on the market: The case of cash transfers in rural 
Malawi’, Development Policy Review, vol. 26, no.1, 2008, pp. 91–111. See also I. Hirway, M. R. Saluja and B. Yadav, 
‘Employment Guarantee Programme and Pro-Poor Growth in Developing Countries (Academic Publishers, 2009).
60. P. Creti and S. Jaspars (eds), Cash-transfer Programming in Emergencies (London: Oxfam, 2006). 58. N. Pani, ‘Cash transfers can be inflationary’, Business Line, 2 August 2011.
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In this regard, think of the strategic political issue. At 
present, the Indian state is the biggest subsidy state 
in the world. All the subsidies being strewn around 
are selective, in that they are intended to benefit 
certain groups in the population and not others. 
Look carefully and one will soon realize that most 
are actually regressive, because they go to middle-
income or even richer groups at least as much as to 
the income poor. 
A subsidy on fuel, for example, goes to those who 
can afford to have motor vehicles. The total cost 
of fuel subsidies provided by the Indian state each 
year, estimated at over 2 per cent of GDP, would 
be sufficient to fund a universal basic cash transfer 
scheme. One may ask rhetorically why the critics of 
cash transfers do not contrast them with existing 
subsidies rather than with public services.
The first and perhaps most important argument in 
favour of cash transfers is that they would gave 
recipients a greater sense of basic economic 
security and economic freedom. People who have 
an assurance that they will have some income to 
cover their most basic of needs will have basic 
security and will be better placed to make rational 
choices about consumption, work and labour, and 
personal relationships. 
In effect, cash transfers could satisfy the Security 
Difference Principle as long as they are universal and 
unconditional. The caveats are important. If they were 
targeted, for instance, they would almost certainly 
exclude some people who would be among the most 
insecure in society. 
It must be constantly reiterated that no means-tested 
social assistance scheme in the world has been 
successful in reaching all of its intended beneficiaries. 
Again and again, research findings show that 
targeting through designating who is poor and who 
is not result in large numbers of ‘poor’ not receiving 
benefits and some who are not poor receiving them. 
This is something inherent in such schemes. 
Targeted cash transfers are no different from targeted 
subsidies or targeted public services in this respect. 
They all suffer from what statisticians call Type 1 and 
Type 2 errors, that is, exclusion and inclusion errors. 
They also induce what are called moral hazards and 
immoral hazards.
Finally, as far as economic citizenship is concerned, 
there is international evidence that individualized 
cash transfers strengthen financial self-reliance and 
the dignity of family and community members who 
are structurally weak. In particular, they have been 
shown to strengthen the relative position of the 
elderly and women.  
 
2.2 ‘Cash Transfers Would Combat 
       Paternalism and Enhance Freedom’
A second advantage of universal unconditional cash 
transfers – and not of conditional cash transfers 
– is that they would satisfy the Paternalism Test 
Principle, as outlined earlier, at least better than 
any available alternative policy. Paternalism arises 
from a presumption made by policymakers, and by 
many commentators and economists, that they know 
what the poor lack and what they want and need. 
Paternalism takes away people’s sense of agency.
One implicit view is derisible, which is that the 
poor lack the ability to make rational choices about 
how to spend money, and for this reason they 
should be given things that are good for them. One 
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suspects this attitude is pervasive and is linked in 
complex ways to the caste system with its baggage 
of patronizing prejudices that is translated into 
structural limitations of choice. 
One could even hypothesize that a system of 
universal cash transfers could help break that 
structure and be a means to indirectly erode caste 
inequalities. Once a person possesses the means 
to make choices rationally, he or she tends to learn 
from trial and error. To say that people lack the ability 
to make choices is the reason for opposing cash 
transfers is equivalent to justifying the persistence of 
any such inability. 
This does not mean that people do not make bad 
choices; we all do. What are required are better 
information, better infrastructure and better 
opportunities to make rational choices. That could 
not come from a rigid system of predetermined 
disbursement of selected commodities. By extension, 
conditional cash transfers are also freedom 
constraining, which is one reason for preferring 
unconditional transfers61. 
Finally in this regard, it is mildly amusing that 
opposition to cash transfers tends to come from 
people who would not want their own freedom of 
choice to be constrained by a lack of ready cash. They 
invariably want the freedom to make choices about 
how they spend their income. Even if people spend 
unwisely, they would bitterly resent being told how 
to spend their money well. They should respect their 
fellow citizens by the same token. 
2.3 ‘Cash Transfers Would Limit  
Bureaucrats’ Discretionary Power’
A third advantage is that they would satisfy the 
Rights-not-Charity Principle. This is not the same as 
the Paternalism Principle, in that it relates to the actual 
process of policy implementation. What defenders 
of the existing subsidy system cannot sensibly 
deny is that it gives administrators and bureaucrats 
tremendous licence to be lax, discretionary and 
arbitrary in the way they conduct themselves and 
interpret the policies.
 
Though the most attention is given to blatant 
corruption, this is not the fundamental problem; it is 
that the policies give too many people in the complex 
structure the opportunity to make judgements on 
whom to help and whom not to help. It ill becomes 
progressive critics of cash transfers to ignore this 
inherent feature of policies that must rely on subjective 
judgements by bureaucrats, from the top all the way to 
the bottom of the edifice of the subsidy state. 
Would direct and universal cash transfers (UCT) 
overcome the discretionary tendency? It may not do 
so entirely, but the very transparency and simplicity 
of UCT would tend to minimize the opportunity for 
bureaucrats to be discretionary. This is an advantage 
by any right. And that everybody is entitled to receive 
it must strengthen a sense of social solidarity and thus 
prompt a collective defence of UCT, which ensures 
every person receives his or her due. 
In such circumstances, anyone being cheated in 
some way would be in a relatively strong position 
to elicit support and moral suasion from others 
61. I. Orton, ‘Reasons to be cheerful: How ILO analysis of social transfers worldwide augurs well for a basic income 
(with some caveats)’, paper presented at the 13th International Congress of the Basic Income Earth Network, Sao 
Paulo, Brazil, 30 June–2 July, 2010.
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in the community and thus put pressure on local 
bureaucrats to fulfil their duties.
Universal cash transfers would not offend the 
Ecological Constraint Principle; instead it would 
help in respecting it. At least they would weaken the 
pressure to use public works as the primary weapon 
against poverty and income insecurity, since we know 
that casual low-paid labour by unskilled or untrained 
people tends to use up resources while creating low-
quality goods that have a record of low durability. 
Finally, in terms of respecting the five policy 
principles, universal cash transfers particularly 
respect the Dignified Work Principle, because they 
would give people greater confidence to object to 
exploitative and oppressive labour, people would 
have less fear of becoming destitute, and the cash 
transfers would give them greater opportunity to do 
work that is not labour. After all, it is the poor who 
have to labour more because of the low returns they 
get for their labour. 
2.4 ‘Cash Transfers Would Increase Social Policy 
Efficiency’
What then are the practical advantages? As cash 
transfers are in money form, they necessarily involve 
less administration and transaction costs than other 
forms of benefit. If there is a comprehensive banking 
system to facilitate cash transfers, it would be the 
easiest way to implement transfers. But even without 
such a system, there are other means by which 
cash payments can be made that are far easier and 
transparent than are involved in, say, food transfers 
or public works schemes.
Cash transfers have been criticized for being difficult 
to operate in the absence of individualized bank 
accounts. But think how much more difficult it is to 
operate a national system of distributing subsidized 
goods, with all the complexity of purchasing, 
collecting, storing, pricing, measuring and distributing 
items across thousands and thousands of villages.
The international evidence is encouraging for 
those who believe cash transfers would reduce the 
administrative costs of social policy. In Mexico, for 
instance, once the initial take up costs were covered, 
annual administrative costs fell to five cents for each 
dollar’s worth of transfer. If one compares this sort 
of cost with the huge per Rupee cost of the PDS and 
NREGS in India, one can imagine the huge savings 
that could be made through cash transfers. 
  
Finally, and most importantly in terms of conventional 
evaluations, there are the behavioural and attitudinal 
advantages of cash transfers. Let us deal with the latter 
first, since too little attention is given to them in the 
theoretical and empirical literature on cash transfers.
2.5 ‘Cash Transfers Would Reduce Poverty’
The truth of this statement is not obvious; some 
sceptical economists would even say that cash transfers 
would not reduce poverty. So, it is worth emphasizing 
that there is extensive evidence from elsewhere that 
they can reduce and have reduced the incidence of 
poverty substantially. Many examples could be given, 
but it would suffice to note a few. In Mexico, the 
Oportunidades scheme reduced the poverty headcount 
ratio by 10 per cent, the poverty gap by 30 per cent and 
the poverty severity index by 45 per cent62. 
62. E. Skoufias and S. Parker, ‘Conditional cash transfers and their impact on child work and schooling: Evidence from 
PROGRESA program in Mexico’, Economia, no.2, 2001, pp. 45–96.
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In the pilot basic income scheme in Namibia, the cash 
transfer was shown to reduce the number who had 
insufficient income for food, basic housing needs 
and access to schooling and health facilities. In other 
words, it showed that the poor use their additional 
money to improve their basic living standards. 
Others have shown that a basic social security system 
based on cash transfers can make the difference 
between achieving and not achieving the key MDG 
(Millennium Development Goal) of halving poverty by 
201563. Critics might argue that other policies could 
do even better. However, there is little doubt that cash 
transfers can and do reduce the incidence and extent 
of poverty.
2.6 ‘Cash Transfers Would Strengthen Social 
Solidarity and Reduce Inequality’
If people are guaranteed a modest basic cash transfer, 
coming in month after month, they have basic security. 
Psychologists have shown that this is associated with 
a greater sense of altruism and social solidarity, which 
are intangibles with considerable social value. People 
who feel secure themselves are more inclined to be 
tolerant towards others, particularly towards others 
with different characteristics than their own64. 
 
In India, this is particularly important, given the 
lingering caste system and the religious tensions that 
have marred its history. If people feel that all of them 
are receiving cash equally, there is strong reason to 
think that they will feel less resentful towards others65. 
Cash transfers would tend to reduce income 
inequality. If a specific amount was paid equally to all, 
cash transfers would obviously represent a greater 
relative share of income of lower income groups. 
To the objection that it is inefficient to give rich people 
as well as poor people a modest cash transfer, two 
arguments can be presented. The first is that the 
money could be recovered through a clawback of 
higher taxes on luxury goods and services that only 
the rich consume. The second would be to devise 
a strategy on the lines of what  Iran has done since 
2010. There, a universal cash transfer was introduced 
to replace the hefty oil subsidies. In order to become 
eligible for the new monthly cash transfer, citizens 
were required to fill in a tax form. For most Iranians, 
this did not matter, since they did not have enough 
income on which to pay tax. But the government 
announced that if the rich did not want to receive the 
cash transfer, they need not fill in the form; and they 
actually encouraged them not to apply66. 
A more interesting aspect of how cash transfers can 
reduce income inequality is that they tend to lessen 
the debt and credit restraints on lower income groups. 
In the Namibian universal cash transfer pilot, it was 
observed that in the year following the introduction 
63. I. Ortiz and J. Yablonski, Investing in People: Social Protection for All (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2010).
64. This was shown, for instance, in a series of surveys, one of which was conducted in India, that were summarized 
in ILO, Economic Security for a Better World (Geneva: ILO, 2005).
65. There is also evidence that schemes that are for all groups strengthen a sense of social solidarity, whereas 
schemes that are only for the poor invariably become poor programmes, a point made by Richard Titmuss many years 
ago and reiterated by Amartya Sen, among others. A. Sen, ‘The political economy of targeting’, in Public Spending and 
the Poor: Theory and Evidence, D.van de Walle and K. Nead (eds), (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).
66. Ironically, initially this led to only about 80 per cent of the population applying for and receiving the cash transfer. 
However, after a few months, many more of the relatively affluent lost their fear and applied as well, resulting in a take 
up of well over 90 per cent. For an excellent analysis, see H. Tabatabai, ‘The basic income road to reforming Iran’s price 
subsidies’, Basic Income Studies, vol.6, issue 1, August 2011, pp. 1–23.
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of the grants, the earned income of those who had 
been among the poorest beforehand went up more 
than for those who had been higher income earners. 
A reason was that the poorest were able to buy 
seeds and small-scale equipment, such as sewing 
machines, and pay off their debts.
From Latin American CCT experience, there is little 
doubt that they can and do reduce inequality67. 
The evidence reminds us that Brazil, in particular, 
is one of the very few countries that have reduced 
inequality in the twenty-first century, and this 
achievement is precisely linked to the introduction 
of the extensive cash transfer scheme. Meanwhile, 
inequality grew dramatically in India.  
   
2.7 ‘Cash Transfers Would Boost Human 
Development – Education’ 
Now we come to the tangible behavioural effects. 
There are three aspects that have been analysed 
more than any other (education, health and 
nutrition, and economic activity). First, there is a 
link between cash transfers and ‘human capital’ 
formation, measured mainly by enrolment, 
attendance and performance in school. Here the 
arguments and evidence, although strongly positive, 
are difficult to unravel, since the predominant form 
of cash transfer has been the proverbial conditional 
cash transfer in which the primary ‘condition’ is 
proof of regular attendance in school by children 
of the recipient. We may list the primary education-
related hypotheses that have been associated with 
cash transfers:
i. They raise school enrolment.
ii. They raise school attendance.
iii. They improve school performance.
iv. They reduce school drop-out rates.
v. They lead to a prolonged schooling, mainly 
through the effects of (i) to (iv).
vi. They reduce child labour that disrupts 
schooling, both through an income effect and 
through the increased propensity to attend and 
continue schooling.
vii. They reduce the inequalities in school 
attendance and attainment associated with 
family background, wealth and household 
income.
viii. They reduce gender inequalities in all the  
above respects. 
 
The primary difficulty of interpreting most of the 
empirical evaluations of CCTs is separating out the 
effect of the cash transfer per se from the effect of 
the conditionality. What is clear is that the evidence 
is very strong that CCTs in Latin America and 
elsewhere have been associated with increased 
school attendance, although the evidence is less 
strong with respect to school performance, albeit 
mostly positive68. 
In Mexico, for instance, since Oportunidades was 
introduced (initially as Progresa), secondary school 
enrolment has risen by a third and school drop-out 
67. See, for instance, S. Soares, ‘Conditional cash transfers in Brazil, Chile and Mexico: Implications for inequality’, 
New York, International Poverty Centre Working Paper No.35, 2007.
68. For reviews of the evidence of conditional cash transfers, largely focussing on Latin America, see A. Fiszbein and 
N. Schady, with F.H.G. Ferreira, M. Grosh, N. Kelleher, P. Olinto and E. Skoufias, Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing 
Present and Future Poverty (Washington, DC: The World Bank, February 2009); R. Slavin, ‘Can financial incentives 
enhance educational outcomes? Evidence from international experiments’, Educational Research Review,vol.5, no.1, 
2010, pp.68–80.
From Latin American 
CCT experience, there 
is little doubt that 
transfers can and do 
reduce inequality.
Cash Transfers: A Review of the Issues in India Principal Hypotheses with CashTransfers
80 81
rates have fallen by 20 per cent. There and elsewhere, 
attendance rates have also been up. A major question 
is whether unconditional cash transfers would have 
the same positive effect, or to it put differently, 
whether conditionality is necessary or positive in 
its effect. Here, there is evidence that conditions 
are indeed unnecessary. For instance, the evidence 
from the pilot unconditional cash transfer scheme 
in Namibian villages in 2008–2009 is encouraging. 
In Namibia, it was found that, almost immediately, 
school attendance rates went up sharply, even 
though there was no pressure, moral or other, on the 
parents to send their children to school assiduously. 
The dynamics in the local community were revealing. 
The primary school was a public state school, 
but parents were required to pay a modest fee 
(equivalent to about Rs 50 for each term) for each 
child registering in the school. Before the launch of 
the cash transfer scheme, school registration and 
attendance were low, and the school had too little 
income from fees to pay for basics, which made the 
school unattractive and lowered the morale of the 
teachers. Once the cash transfer scheme started, 
parents suddenly had enough money to pay school 
fees, and teachers had enough money to buy paper, 
pens, books and items such as posters, paints and 
brushes. So the school environment became more 
attractive, giving parents and children an incentive, 
while raising the morale and, probably, the teaching 
capacity of the teachers.
An evaluation of another scheme in Africa, ostensibly 
conditional, also suggested that it is the cash transfer 
rather than the conditionality that was likely to have 
had the positive effect. In this scheme, the evidence 
was accidental in that the scheme was meant to be 
a CCT one, but in one area the designers forgot to 
inform the recipients about the conditions and also 
forgot to implement the conditionality. So, the 
evidence that subsequently emerged was  
by chance.
The pilot was conducted in Malawi, another low-
income country with poor infrastructure and long 
distances for children to travel to and from school. 
A sophisticated econometric evaluation concluded 
that ‘a $5/month transfer to a household made 
unconditionally had roughly the same impact on 
schooling outcomes as a $15/month transfer made 
conditional on school attendance69.’ 
        
In general, both unconditional and conditional 
cash transfer schemes have been associated with 
a rise in school enrolment as has been found in 
Latin America and in various African countries. In 
South Africa, the effect was particularly large for 
very young children70. Similarly, in Malawi, cash 
transfers resulted in higher school enrolment and a 
reduction in the drop-out rate from school71. More 
generally, there is growing evidence that the impact 
of cash transfers varies by age group. In low-
income areas, they are likely to have a particularly 
strong impact on early school attendance, whereas 
in higher income areas, the effect is more likely to 
be observable for older age groups.
69. S. Baird, C. McIntosh and B. Ozler, ‘Designing Cost-Effective Cash Transfer Programs to Boost Schooling among 
Young Women in Sub-Saharan Africa’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.5090, (Washington, DC: The 
World Bank, October 2009) p.22. 
70. A. Case, V. Hosegood and F. Lund, ‘The reach of the South African Child Support Grant: Evidence from KwaZulu-
Natal’ Research Programme in Development Studies Working Paper 224, Princeton University, 2005; M. Samson, 
U. Lee, A. Ndlebe, K. MacQuene, I. van Niekerk, V. Gandhi et al, ‘Final Report: Social and Economic Impact of South 
Africa’s Social Security System’, Cape Town, Economic Policy Research Institute Research Paper No.37, 2004.  
71. C. Miller, M. Tsoka and K. Reichert, ‘The impact of the Social Cash Transfer Scheme on Food Security in Malawiu’, 
Food Policy, vol. 36, no.2, pp. 230–238; MCDSS/GTZ, 2006.
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The evidence from various countries suggests that 
the positive effect on school enrolment is particularly 
strong for young girls as found in Bangladesh and 
Cambodia as well as in Latin American countries72. 
This strong effect is surely of great significance for 
India today, where the lack of attention to girls has 
been a social sore of shame.
Finally, there is the impact of cash transfers on the 
incidence and extent of child labour, particularly in 
hazardous forms and in forms that interfere with 
schooling. The evidence is mixed, although mostly 
positive. In Brazil, a study by the Inter-American 
Development Bank estimated that the CCT reduced 
child labour substantially. Other studies have 
been less sure. But on balance, if cash transfer 
programmes have positive effects on schooling, it is 
likely that they also have a modest negative effect on 
the extent of child labour. 
 
2.8 ‘Cash Transfers Would Improve Health 
and Nutrition’
Then there is the effect on health. Some state that 
cash transfers have not had much effect73. But there 
are many studies that suggest strong positive effects 
on child nutrition, child and adult health status, 
the incidence and severity of illness, and use and 
effectiveness of medical services. There are also 
a number of anecdotal narratives that highlight 
the dynamics.
We may list the variety of the main health-related 
effects of cash transfers as follows:
i. They improve maternal health, thereby 
reducing female morbidity and health 
problems related to child-birth, as well as 
reduced maternal mortality.
ii. They improve child nutrition, resulting in less 
stunting and improved weight-for-age and 
height-for-age.
iii. They result in a greater incidence of timely 
vaccinations among children against diseases 
such as polio, diphtheria and tetanus. 
iv. They result in greater use of health services, 
including greater use of services involving user 
fees, and greater resort to preventative health 
services.
Let us start with the impact on child nutrition and 
health. One must acknowledge that there are some 
studies that have been sceptical about the impact74. 
However, the majority have been positive. For 
instance, in Colombia the conditional cash transfer 
resulted in improvement in the average height-for-
age among children75. In Mexico, United Nations 
research indicated that the CCT had reduced stunting 
among babies by 39 per cent for girls and 19 per cent 
for boys. The trouble with these and several other 
studies is that it is unclear how much of the positive 
effect has been due to the conditionality or to the 
72. See, e.g., S.R. Khandker, M. Pitt and N. Fuwa, ‘Subsidy to promote girls’ secondary education: The Female Stipend 
Program in Bangladesh’, Munich, mimeo, March 2003: <http//mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/23688>; D. Filmer and 
N. Schady, ‘Getting girls into school: Evidence from a scholarship programme in Cambodia’, World Bank Policy 
Research Paper 3910 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2006). 
73. S. Narayanan, ‘A case for reframing the cash transfer debate in India’, Economic and Political Weekly,    vol. XLVI, 
no.21, 21 May 2011, p.43.
74. For scepticism on schemes in Honduras and Brazil, see J. Hoddinott and I. Barrett, 
‘Conditional cash transfer programmes and nutrition in Latin America: Awareness of 
impacts and strategies for improvement’, Washington, DC, International Food and 
Policy Research Institute, 2008.
75. O. Attanasio, E. Battistin, E. Fitzimons, A. Mesnard and M. Vera-Hernandez, ‘How 
effective are conditional cash transfers? Evidence from Colombia’, London, Institute 
for Fiscal Studies, IFS Briefing Note 54, 2005.
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cash in itself. Fortunately, there is also evidence 
that unconditional cash transfers have similar 
positive effects76. 
The experience of the pilot cash transfer scheme 
in Namibia is worth highlighting here. Using the 
WHO’s z-score methodology, it was found that within 
six months of the start of the unconditional cash 
transfers, the weight-for-age figures for infants aged 
0–5 years dramatically improved, with underweight 
children moving towards the norm and overweight 
children also doing so as a result of improved diets. 
Note that there was no pressure put on families to 
spend the cash in any particular way – there were 
no conditions. People acted in the way most people 
would act – they looked after the development 
interests of their children. 
 
Unconditional cash transfers have been shown to 
lead to dietary diversity, a beneficial development 
associated with enhanced child nutritional status77. 
Because many more conditional schemes have been 
launched, there is more evidence on their direct 
effects. For instance, Sri Lanka’s Samruddhi cash 
transfer scheme has been associated with improved 
child nutrition. And in many places, including India, 
such schemes have been associated also with a 
reduction in neo-natal and peri-natal deaths78. 
There is also a huge amount of evidence, mainly 
based on Latin American experience, that conditional 
cash transfers result in a substantial increase in the 
use of preventative health services. Conditional cash 
transfers have been associated with an increased 
incidence of health check-ups79. This has also been 
found in India80. But note that this positive effect was 
also shown in the unconditional cash transfer scheme 
in Namibia. 
This should not be surprising, given that people are 
rational and can soon work it out that it is beneficial 
to go for health check-ups from time to time if they 
can afford it and have the time, and if the facilities 
are available. Thus, in those Namibian villages, the 
cash transfers meant that suddenly visits to the local 
clinic became affordable, while the clinic was able 
to make modest improvements to the premises to 
make it more attractive and also raise the morale 
and status of the nurses. With cash transfers, small 
user fees obviously become more affordable. But this 
does not mean that fee waivers should not be used 
for individuals or groups deemed chronically poor or 
chronically prone to illness and medical expenses81. 
Finally, there is also anecdotal evidence that having 
cash with which to pay for medical services results in 
pressure being put on public and private services to 
improve what they provide. 
76. See, for instance, J.M. Aguero, M.R. Carter and I. Wooland, ‘The impact of unconditional cash transfers on 
nutrition: The South African child support grant’, Brasilia, International Poverty Centre, 2007. 
77. See, for instance, M. Adato and L. Bassett, ‘Social protection to support vulnerable children and families: The 
potential of cash transfers to protect education, health and nutrition, ’ AIDS Care: Psychological and Socio-Medical 
Aspects of HIV-AIDS, 21, no.1, supplement 1, 2009, pp.60–75. 
78. R. Himaz, ‘Welfare grants and their impact on child health: The case of Sri Lanka’, World Development, vol. 36, 
no.10, 2008, pp.1843–1857.
79. F. Bastagli, ‘From social safety net to social policy? The role of conditional cash transfers in welfare state 
development in Latin America, Brasilia, IPEA-UNDP Working Paper No.60, 2009.
80. S.S. Lim, L. Dandona, J.A. Hoisington, S.L. James, M.C. Hogan and E. Gakidou, ‘India’s Janani Saraksha Yojan, a 
conditional cash transfer programme to increase births in health facilities: An impact evaluation’, The Lancet, 375, no. 
9730, 2010.
81. For a review of the issues, see R. Bitran and U. Giedion, ‘Waivers and exemptions for health services in developing 
countries’, Washington, DC, Social Protection Discussion Paper Series No.308, The World Bank, 2003.
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82. See research summarized in ILO, 2004.
83. See, for instance, E. Skoufias and V. di Maro, ‘Conditional cash transfers, adult work incentives and current 
poverty’, Washington, DC, The World Bank, 2005.
84. Economic Policy Research Institute, The Social and Economic Impact of South Africa’s Social Security System: 
Final Report, Cape Town, Department of Social Development, EPRI Research Paper 37, 2004.
2.9 ‘Cash Transfers Would Enhance  
       Women’s Economic Activity and  
       Labour Supply’ 
Beyond the two standard outcomes – education 
and health – there are also arguments that cash 
transfers to low-income people and communities 
result in increased economic activity and increased 
labour supply. There is quite a lot of evidence to 
support this claim. It has been given insignificant 
attention by critics of cash transfers. Again, 
the evidence comes from large-scale statistical 
evaluations, from small-scale pilots and from 
anecdotal research.
 
In Brazil, for instance, the Bolsa Escola and its 
successor Bolsa Familia have been associated with 
an increase in female labour force participation, 
because it seems that women were enabled to 
spend on transport and to obtain alternative 
child care82.  In Mexico, evaluations of Progresa-
Oportunidades concluded that the cash transfers 
had no effect on labour force participation83.  
There and elsewhere cash transfers seem to be 
associated with some reduction in child labour, 
which was compensated by an increase in adult 
labour. 
In Namibia, the provision of unconditional cash 
transfers was followed by an increase in work and 
labour force activities by women and an increase 
in job-search activity both by men and women. 
In South Africa, the labour force participation 
rate of those receiving cash transfers increased 
by 13–17 per cent compared with those in similar 
households who did not receive them, with the 
greatest increase coming for women84. 
 
In sum, the arguments in favour of cash transfers 
rest on their potential for having multiple positive 
effects. Unlike the labour line, they do not impose 
onerous labour on already disadvantaged people, 
and unlike the subsidized commodity line, they 
enhance the freedom and agency of people who 
surely need and want more of both.                  
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It is well established that social policy in India has been 
blighted by endemic corruption for many years at all 
levels. At least two questions arise in our context: 
i. Would cash transfers be subject to the same 
degree of corruption as the existing system?
ii. Would it be easier or harder to tackle 
corruption in  cash transfers than in other 
forms of benefit?
The answers to these questions are not obvious, and 
both sides of the debate should acknowledge that, in 
particular, one must recognize the role of distrust in 
the market system per se induced by many years of 
fraud, ‘crony capitalism’ and profiteering. This has 
created a psychological barrier to rational discussion 
of the potential of cash transfers85.
Cash transfers by themselves certainly would not 
eradicate the corruption that has been a deep feature 
of India’s welfare system. Indeed, some cash transfer 
schemes have been exposed as very corrupt, as in Uttar 
Pradesh, where a vast scam was exposed in a scheme 
supposedly giving cash support to pregnant women86. 
However, if one thinks of social policy as having a 
series of steps of decisions and actions, then one might 
conclude that simply because there are fewer steps 
in the provision of direct cash transfers, which consist 
of known and equal amounts, there are fewer steps 
or points at which corruptions could occur. And cash 
transfers that go directly to bank accounts would provide 
a channel for public vigilance, even if governance 
structures may be needed to overcome any tendency by 
banking correspondents to use monopoly powers.
Moreover, with universal cash transfers, the value of 
what should be received would be known to everybody, 
and so any deduction or non-delivery would be visible 
and traceable. This must act as a strong deterrent to any 
intermediary corruption. And local people would have a 
vested interest in supporting anybody who was cheated 
of their cash, since it could easily be him or her next.
Above all, there are exciting electronic possibilities 
that hold out the hope of making huge savings in the 
delivery of cash transfers. McKinsey, the multinational 
consultancy, issued a report in October 2010 that 
concluded, ‘An electronic platform for government 
payments to and from individual households can save 
an estimated Rs.100,000 crore a year – almost 10% 
of the total payment flows between the government 
and households.’87 With the advances in electronic 
technology, the figure may now be somewhat more.  
85. B. Panda, ‘Cash may yet be king’, Indian Express, 8 June 2011.
86. ‘Editorial: India’s welfare muddle’, Economic Times, 21 September 2011, p.16. <http://economictimes.india.times.
com/opinion/editorial/indias-welfare-muddle/articleshow/10061162.cms> 
87. McKinsey and Co, ‘Inclusive Growth and Financial Security’, October 2010, cited in S. Agarwal, ‘Ministry approves 
proposal for UID-linked direct subsidy transfer’, Mint, Delhi, 21 September 2011
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One form of corruption, which is rarely recognized 
as such is political manipulation of policies to secure 
election outcomes or to reward supporters and 
penalize opponents. Some critics of cash transfers 
might worry that their level would be adjusted just 
prior to elections in order to garner more support 
for a government in office. This is always a strong 
possibility with any welfare policy. 
However, with cash transfers there is a relatively easy 
measure that could reduce the likelihood of such 
manipulation. This is to set up an Independent Cash 
Transfer Commission (ICTC) to oversee the whole 
policy, with a mandate to adjust the level depending 
on such factors as economic growth and inflation. 
Such a commission would have to be transparent in 
its dealings, take evidence from experts in a public 
accountable manner and have members who were 
representative of all the relevant interests, including 
most importantly ‘the poor’ themselves.
As with any social policy, there would be a 
democratic governance gap to overcome. One of the 
greatest failings of social policy in India and in the 
whole world is that the intended recipients are treated 
as objects, or at best as beneficiaries of state charity. 
There has been much talk about empowerment and 
participation, but little about how this democratic 
governance gap could be closed. What are needed 
are mechanisms for representatives of the poor and 
the precariat to be on boards of administration or 
their equivalent.
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A third rationale has been based on assessments 
of the behavioural impact of different amounts. 
The typical argument is that if the amount is high 
it will tend to reduce labour supply and economic 
incentives. So, as the argument goes, the amount 
should be quite low. In that regard, it is interesting 
that in Nicaragua after five years of cash transfers 
the monthly amount was lowered slightly, and this 
caused an increase in labour supply88. We observed 
earlier that there is evidence that cash transfers in 
themselves can raise labour supply. But clearly there 
is a balance to be sought. One should also ask the 
question whether an increase in labour supply is 
actually desirable, given that most people have a lot 
of work demands that are outside the labour market.
Finally in this regard, there is the pragmatic 
approach. That is to say that one should start with 
a very low amount of cash or start by targeting one 
group (for example, the elderly, women with young 
children, young children themselves, or the disabled) 
with the intention of gradually rolling it out to others 
and eventually to every legal citizen of the country. 
This would combine moral and fiscal rationales. 
Critics would argue that if the amount was very low, 
it would not be worth providing. But if there was a 
commitment to rolling out the scheme as and when 
the country could bear the cost and in the light of the 
effects of the amount being provided, there should 
be no reason for this being an impediment to its 
progressive realization.     
Any discussion of cash transfers would be incomplete 
if it avoided the simple question: How much? In the 
protracted international debate on basic income, 
this has been controversial for obvious reasons. 
Philosophical reasoning and sophisticated arguments 
are in favour of a full basic income that would be 
sufficient to give an average income for the country. 
However, the two most popular positions have been 
based on economic rationales. The first holds that the 
amount should be sufficient to provide for the basic 
necessities for survival, which would, obviously, be a 
low amount. The second holds that it should amount 
to what would be a social dividend, that is, a return on 
the natural resources of a country, so that the amount 
would be indeterminate a priori. The latter is essentially 
what has been the case of the Alaska Permanent 
Fund, which has been in operation since the early 
1980s, designed to distribute an annual cash transfer 
to every legal resident of Alaska based on the return 
to investment made from part of the profits of the oil 
industry there.
88. J.A. Maluccio, ‘The impact of conditional cash transfers in Nicaragua on consumption, productive investments 
and labour allocation’, Rome, Food and Agricultural Organisation, ESA Working Paper No.07–11 2007; F. Bastagli, 
‘Conditional cash transfers as a tool of social policy’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. XLVI, 21 May 2011, p.63.
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There is one type of situation for which cash 
transfers should be considered separately from the 
mainstream Indian debate. That debate has been 
shaped by whether or not they should be a substitute 
or a complement for subsidies and the labour line. 
But, what about their potential role in the aftermath 
of ecological, social or economic shocks?
As noted in the contextual introduction, the incidence 
of shocks of one kind or another has been rising 
sharply in the globalization era. The reality is that 
in India, and elsewhere, the social, economic and 
ecological shocks have included earthquakes, 
tsunamis, floods, droughts and epidemics. 
The conventional approach has been to react to such 
events with a series of ad hoc responses. In that 
context, insufficient attention has been given to the 
potential role of cash transfers. Yet there is now a 
wealth of examples from around the world to show 
how and when they could be invaluable in helping in 
the recovery phase. 
There is considerable evidence that cash transfers 
do make responses to shocks much more effective89. 
They may make other schemes work better at the 
same time, and enable community-based health 
insurance schemes to survive shocks90.  
The key lesson is that they must be part of a package 
of reactive policies. By themselves, they certainly 
would not solve the crisis. It is first necessary to 
re-establish supply of basic goods and services. But 
at that stage, an influx of cash can regenerate the 
local economy as well as raise morale and economic 
purchasing power. 
89. See, for instance, P.M. Mvula, ‘The Dowa Emergency Cash Transfer Project: A study of the social 
impacts’,Johannesburg, Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programmes, 2007; D. Datta, A. Ejakait and K. Scriven, 
‘Cash transfers through mobile phones: An innovative emergency response in Kenya’, London, ALNAP Innovations 
Case Study 1, 2009.
 90. For the value of these in general, see M. Ranson, ‘Reduction in catastrophic health care expenditure by a 
community-based health insurance scheme in Gujarat, India’, Bulletin of the World Health Organisation, vol. 8, no.8.
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91. This is not the same as the pilot to which reference was made earlier, which is an additional cash transfer scheme, 
without any displacement of subsidies for consumption.
A unique feature of an ongoing pilot scheme in Delhi 
orchestrated by SEWA was that residents in one 
area of Delhi were offered a choice of continuing 
to receive the rationed subsidized food and other 
basic commodities or receiving cash transfers91. 
This free choice created vehement opposition to the 
pilot experiment. However, it might have helped to 
defuse some opposition and suspicion among the 
local population if not activist groups with political 
agendas.
The idea of giving people a choice is initially 
attractive, and it has virtue in offering a means 
by which sceptics can opt for continuing with the 
existing scheme if they wish. But it does have 
potential drawbacks that should be recognized. 
One is that people could shift back and forth 
opportunistically and at short notice, if, for example, 
rations do not come into the shop or if they have 
stocked up on rations and then opt for the cash 
transfer, which would be an additional benefit rather 
than a substitute. But these are practical issues that 
could be resolved by making switches acceptable 
only with a month or more of notice or some 
such rule.
A more generic criticism of the choice approach is 
that it suggests that those who pose the choice see 
the policies as in competition and as alternatives. 
This is being unfair to cash transfers. What cash 
transfers should be judged on is their impact on 
welfare, behaviour and attitudes not on whether 
some people want food and some people do not as 
much. There is no need for this extra weight to be put 
on the evaluation exercise. 
Human rationality being what it is, there is a common 
tendency to fear losing what we already have, which 
even if we are offered something better deters us 
from taking it. People, particularly if economically 
and socially insecure, and even more so if they lack 
knowledge and distrust bureaucratic officials dealing 
with them, tend to opt for what they have, rather than 
risk having something better. This is one 
further powerful reason for being cautious about 
the choice approach.
Another factor, which is one this author used in 
responding to Jean Dreze’s critique of cash transfers, 
is that the choice is not adequately captured92. Dreze 
proposed that the poor should be asked whether they 
would prefer food or the equivalent in cash. But 
this is not what is confronting social and economic 
92. Dreze, ‘The cash mantra’, 2011; Standing, The Precariat, 2011.
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policymakers. If only 40 per cent of the expenditure 
on food through the PDS reaches its target (and 
one must wonder if that is actually an overestimate, 
given that much of the food reaches the non-poor 
rather than the poor), and if the policy decision was 
to replace the PDS by cash transfers, then the fair 
choice should be between the actual value of the food 
received and the per capita expenditure on the PDS 
in cash form. If the value of PDS food was Rs 200 a 
month, for example, then the fair question should be, 
‘Would you prefer to receive the PDS food worth Rs 
200 a month or receive Rs 500  in a cash transfer?’ 
There is also a practical and rather ugly reality of the 
choice option. This is that posing a choice to insecure 
residents of a low-income area leaves them open 
to intimidation by opponents of change. This was 
evidently the reality in Delhi in the early months of 
2011. Some critics, including ration shop owners, 
have frightened participants in the pilot project by 
telling them that their BPL cards would be withdrawn 
if they participated in the project. In effect, the 
objective testing of cash transfers could be distorted 
by the nature of the opposition on behalf of vested 
interests and ideologically driven intimidation.
In its favour, the choice option approach would also 
put pressure on the ration shops to improve the 
service they are supposed to provide to the poor. 
The privileged shops will fear losing customers. This 
is also an argument in favour of having competition 
in the food markets. Another is that the option of 
returning to the ration shops will put pressure on 
the government to provide a ‘fair amount of cash’, 
enabling the cash to be an ‘automatic stabilizer’. 
One must doubt the efficiency of this mechanism, 
since the main cost would be borne by frustrated 
people who switch back to the BPL system and thus 
put pressure on its supply chain at short notice. Cash 
transfers should and could be adjusted to become 
automatic stabilizers, but it would surely be unwise 
to mix up that function with low-income consumers 
switching under duress.
Ultimately, the authorities and the critics must come 
to the realization that the BPL/APL card system is a 
mess – chronically inefficient, chronically inequitable 
and an impediment to the development of a sound 
social protection system.            
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Cash transfers can affect people’s morale, their 
attitudes to others, to their communities and other 
policies, and their behaviour. Most studies of cash 
transfers have only focussed on some of the last 
mentioned type of effects. Other aspects may be 
even more important in the longer term frame of 
development and social cohesion. 
In evaluations of cash transfers, there should also 
be a range of effects to consider – on the individual 
recipient, on his or her household and wider 
kinship group, and on the communities in which the 
individual is situated. Most evaluations have focussed 
on the narrower issues, rather than on the potential 
for community development and social solidarity. 
In India, as elsewhere, we are at a critical stage in 
the debate on cash transfers. So far the debate has 
been rather aggressive as seen in the posturing and 
pejorative comments. In that context, it should be 
recognized that there are essentially four perspectives 
that should be defining the contours of the debate. 
Let us conclude by trying to articulate each of these 
fairly and transparently.
First, there are some who see cash transfers as 
part of a grand design to create a free market 
economy, in which the role of the state as a 
social protection agency shrinks and occupies a 
peripheral status. This is the ‘neo-liberal’ model. 
It should be stated categorically that the majority 
of those involved in the debate proposing cash 
transfers do not take this approach.
Second, there are those who oppose cash transfers 
on ideological grounds. They are convinced that they 
are no more than a wedge opening up the economy 
to market forces and a means of making privatization 
and commercialization feasible and tolerable. From 
this perspective, critics feel that they would be unable 
to ensure conditions that would counteract the effects 
of an unregulated market economy and that would 
make cash transfers work for the redistributive or 
progressive objectives they claim to want to promote. 
Third, there are those who see cash transfers as 
a necessary or desirable complement for a state-
based social protection system in which public social 
services are an integral part. The critics who attack 
cash transfers and their proponents, as if they are 
set against a social state, do themselves and the 
cause of the poor and economically insecure a gross 
disservice. Indeed, what we should be struggling 
to achieve is a strategy to strengthen economic 
security through cash transfers while providing 
better and more public services. This could be helped 
through ridding the county of the hugely expensive 
and inegalitarian subsidies that eat up a large part 
of national income and corrode trust in the public 
sphere in general. 
Meanwhile, it may well turn out that universal cash 
transfers are an important way to induce better and 
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greater use of public social services. People with 
money can demand better and can help to induce 
better services from providers. 
Fourth, and by no means in contradiction with the 
third perspective, there are those who believe that 
cash transfers can work efficiently and equitably only 
if combined with mechanisms that give voice to the 
economically insecure and vulnerable. For more than 
twenty-five years, the writer of this paper has been 
arguing that cash transfers should never be seen in 
isolation or as a stand-alone policy. They could be 
used for good or they could be used for something 
many social policy analysts would regard as evil. 
A danger is that, if the conditionalists have their 
way, they could fall prey to social engineering 
and be used politically for their compliance with 
unsavoury policies in other spheres or to influence 
elections. There is no reason to think that either 
of these possibilities will come to be a reality. But 
it is essential to pre-empt trends that could push 
the state in that direction. The paternalists must be 
opposed. The strongest way to do that is to ensure 
that collective-voice institutions and associations 
exist to combat potential misuse and to assist people 
unfamiliar with financial matters to make better use 
of cash when they receive it. 
It is important to 
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